THE^PEGmL CAMPASQn'sERSES

THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

BY COL. F. N. MAUDE <iate R.E)

CORNELL

UNIVERSITY

LIBRARY

GIFT OF

Mrs, Dana B. Van Dusen In memory of her husband

B Cornell University 9 Library

The original of tliis book is in the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024321782

DC 236.6:M44 """"''** '•'""T'

THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 1813

THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES

Price 51. net each,

I. SAARBRCCK to PARIS ! Thk Fkanco-Gskman Wak. By Coi. SissoN C. PiiATT, late R. A.

II. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877. By Major F. Mauhice.

III. FREDERICKSBURG : A STUDY

IN WAR, 1 862 . By Major G. W.

RiDWAY.

IV. THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA

and SOLFERINO, 1859. By Col. H, C. Wylly, C.B.

V. THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 1866. By Lt.-Col. GlOnickr.

VI. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. By Col. Sisson C. Pratt, late R.A.

VII. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN, 18x3. By Col. F. N. Maude, C.B.,late R.E.

VIII. GRANT'S CAMPAIGN JN VIRGINIA, 1864 (The Wilderness Campaign). By Capt. Vauguan- Sawyer, Indian Army.

In Preparation.

IX. THE JENA CAMPAIGN, 1806. By Col. F. N. MavDe, C.B., late R.E.

SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. No. 7

THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

1813

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B.

(lATE R.E.) P.S.C.

LONDON

SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM

New York: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1908

ib

ddi

INTRODUCTION

" AiORS, un homme s'el^vera, peut-etre reste jusque-la dans la foule et I'obscurite, un homme qui ne se sera fait un nom ni par ses paroles, ni par ses eorits un homme qui aura medite dans le sUenoe, un homme enfin qui aura peut-etre ignore son talent, qui ne I'aura senti qu'en I'exergant, et qui aura fort peu etudie. Get homme s'emparera des opinions, des circonstances de la fortune ; et il dira du grand theoricien ce que I'archi- tecte praoticien disait devant les Atheniens de I'archi- tecte orateur ; ce que mon rival vous a dit, je I'execu- terai." ^

In these words Guibert, one of the ablest military writers of his day, predicted the coming of the great Napoleon, and perhaps few prophecies have received more prompt or more startling realization.

They describe Napoleon to the letter — he had not studied much; using words in their ordinary sense,

'■ Then will arise a man, hitherto lost in the obscurity of the crowd ; a man who has not made his name either by speech or writing. A man who has meditated silently, and ignoring his own talent, has only been conscious of its power whilst actually exercising it ; ' one who has studied but very Uttle. This man will seize hold of opinions of circumstances and of fortune, and will say of the great theoretician what the practical architect said of the orator, ' All that my rival tells you, I will carry out.'" — Guibert, TraM de grand Tactiqye, 1778.

xiv INTRODUCTION

and reducing the thoughts they 6onvey to relative values ; he had not thought much, he never- had time for that ; he had simply " done things." Then, from that time forward, the problem has continued to vex men's minds, What was the true secret.pf his^PP^er of execution?

JkJ^&-SJgfefr?JSars or there^bflu^_a|fer.,iisjdosa^ jaU_at "Vyaterloo, no glhmner of a_sQljJi|i^_was dis- covered. Even the acuteness of a mind like that of the keenest military critic which the nineteenth century produced, viz., Clausewitz, failed to shed light on the Napoleonic secret, and the deeds of his most distin- guished pupU, von Moltke, shew no signs of its appre- ciation. Napoleon's own comments on his campaigns, dictated, as they mostly are, with the desire to justify his conduct from the standpoint of his own contemporaries, seemed the most barren in suggestion of any, and it was not tmtil the collective intelligence of the whole French General Staff was brought to bear upon his correspond- ence and the archives which till recently had remained locked up within the walls of the War Ministry in Paris, that it became possible to reconstruct an outhne of the train of reasoning which so often led him to vic- tory. This reconstruction explains in the most remark- able manner the true solution of the ethical problem which the persistence of war, "as an act of human intercourse," (to quote Clausewitz's definition) has always involved.

But this solution stiU leaves us face to face with a psychological problem of extreme interest, that finds its completest expression in the incidents of this cam- paign of 1813. for it reveals to us Napoleon at his best.

INTRODUCTION xv

and at his Vorst, and compels us to face the question whether he himself was at all times conscious of his own secret — or, in other words, were his successes the outcome of mental processes, or did they spring from impulses of intuitive genius ? Was the mind that executed the brilliant manoeuvres which culminated on the field of Liitzen the same as that which remained hesitating in ^tiful indecision during the crisis of events around Dresdeiv)and then again rose to a climax of grandeur in the "movements by which he final^ brought a nearly two to one numerical superiority on to the decisive point of the battlefield of Leipzig ?

The great difficulty to the student of the present day in studying these campaigns is to form an adequate mental picture of the nature of the troops opposed to one another, their courage, intelligence and aptitude for War generally. Progress in armaments and scienti- fic inventions applicable to War has been so vast during the century that has since elapsed that we are apt to lose sight of the fact that, though education of the masses is certainly higher, the ultimate nature of the man has varied very little indeed, and it is this which counts most essentially in War. On the other hand, the means of controlling the masses and generating the " resultant thought wave " which sways alike both armies and crowds, have enormously increased. Where during the Napoleonic epoch it took months, even years, to lash a whole nation into full fighting fury, the Press nowadays can electrify an Empire widespread even as ours into frenzy, and the point of psychological interest is this, that once individuals are united into " crowds " either by contiguity or by community of

xvi INTRODUCTION

sentiment, which is asc^tained and comnmnicated by the electric telegraph, to say nothing of other more subtle sympathetic currents of forces less generally recognized though equally real, the ultimate unit of ,the crowd ceases to be a free agent, and becomes an automaton directed and controlled by the will of the majority, almost to the same extent as if he were actu- ally hypnotized ; his courage and endurance are in- creased or diminished far beyond the Emits of his own I individual will. No average man alone could act with the cowardice of which a panic-struck mob is capable, nor could he rise to the subhme heights of self-devotion ' a well-led assaulting column on a breach has often displayed. Look at the mere physical obstacles such men have overcome in cold blood, and judge by your own feelings. Empirically this fact has always been recognized, and mUitary discipUne with aU its forms and ceremonies is the direct consequence of centuries of such experience. Its object is to control and regulate such manifestations of the " resultant thought wave," j and to ensure that it acts in the direction of self-sacrifice, ' not of seK-preservation. This art of raising men col- \ lectively above the fear of death may be considered to have reached its highest development in the days of Frederick the Great. Certainly troops of his nation have never shown equal endurance since ; but he had both war-experienced men, time, and physically ade- quate men to train.

Napoleon had neither time nor really suitable material to work upon, for ^e Bevolution and the years of previous famine had lowered thephysical standard of the race, and his officers, though war-experienced, had

tNTRODUCTlOM xvli

been trained to a different standard.^ Hence he had to find means to win battles with inferior troops, and this problem he solved, first by the strategical concen- tration of greater numbers, and second by a more skil- ful combination of the three arms, more particularly of the^^ji^j, which had at length developed mobility sufficient for his requirements. In Frederick the Great's day battles had been essentially infantry duels, in which the cavalry intervened at the decisive moment. Under Napoleon the infantry to whom the decisive attack was committed were held back until, as in a siege, the approaches and breaching batteries had so far dis- turbed the equilibrium, that no serious resistance to the storming colimms could any longer be anticipated. His infantry carried position after position, not be- cause th^y were intrinsically braver than their adver- saries, but because, when the time came to launch them forward, they were good enough to face such punish- ment as their exhausted opponents were stUl in a con- dition to administer. Naturally this is not the view the French Infantry took of it. On the contrary, they were taught to consider themselves irresistible with the bayonet, as, indeed, all infantries must beheve themselves to be. Whether they are so or not depends on the skill of the leader who employs them, in suiting the task to their quality ; and when that leader fails to grasp the true point, viz., that it is the previously- acquired fire superiority, whether of infantry or of

1 Contrast the losses during the battles of the Seven Tears' War and those in the encounters of the French Revolution. Average of the principal battles in the former, 17 per cent. ; in the latter, about 3 per cent.

xviii INTRODUCTION

artillery, or of bot^that deterimnes_success, the results are generally disastrous, as in the American Civil War and the Bohemian campaign. When our own troops are called upon again for a J \^ Great War on the Napoleonic scale (and such a War must be the inevitable outcome of the struggle for commercial supremacy now in progress around us), we shall find ourselves very much in the position of the French Generals of the Eevolutionary era, viz., with immense numbers of relatively untrained men driven by starva- tion behind them, and the problem will be how to make the best use of the spirit of self-sacrifice which these men will bring with them, as the necessary con- sequence of their coming forward at aU. Such a War win be very different indeed from any of which the present generation has had direct experience, the only thing that can with certainty be predicted about it being that since it must be fought out under Western conditions of civilization — ^roads, railways, telegraphs, etc. — ^it Tvill approximate far more closely to modern French and German conceptions, which are in turn the outcome of the study of the Napoleonic period-^ than to any more recent model, such as the magnified poHce raid into the Transvaal, or the eighteenth century methods forced upon the Japanese by the roadless condition of Manchuria.

Now the cardinal point of the Napoleonic strategy, the spirit underlying the form in which it found ex- pression, was his doctrine of the " economy of forces," which rnerely meant that every body of troops, com- mitted^undCT'jfije, ^whether tactically or stjategically 3idnot signify, had to be fought out to its utmost limit^

INTRODUCTION xix

of endurance. There was no iialk in the old Grand Aimy of troops being " sacrificed," because every rank knew that self-sacrifice was exactly what their leader expected of them — ^what they were there for, in fact — because it was only by this sacrifice on their part that he could save up really fresh intapt troops for the final act of decision. Generals were strictly called to account by him, if they wasted their men by tactical incompe- tence ; but the spirit of his Army never allowed the men to think for themselves that their chief individual pre-occupation should be " to live to fight another day."

Once this idea is allowed to take root in an Army it always takes a long time and much unnecessary loss of life to eradicate it. Witness the early attempts at battle fighting in the French Revolution and in the American Civil War. It takes many defeats before a whole Army comes to realize that no decisive victories have ever been won by the uncontrolled prowess of individual skirmishers alone ; but once it has been learnt, experi- ence shows that even battalions formed of nine-tenths sixty day conscripts, or raw illiterate farmer lads, such as were the East Prussian and Silesian Landwehr, can be trusted to charge home with bayonets and pike in the teeth of the case fire from manv batteries. i.e. against a storm of buUets greater by far than anv line j of breechloaders haa~TyCT yfeT d^vg^ISuaclaa^ and whether this sacrifice of life has been futile or the reverse has depended, and always will depend, on the skill of the General who ordered it, whether he has correctly seized his opportunity or rashly anticipated it.

It seems to me that, especially with troops of very short service, it is far more imperative to cherish this

XX INTRODUCTION

desire to get killed than the reverse, and fortunately it is the easier of the two to obtain, for all men love the excitement of a charge, even if it is only a mimic one. The newspapers may tell them next day that they would all have been dead men, and that in face of modern weapons, etc., etc., such things are impossible ; but they don't beUeve what they, read — ^perhaps some of the others might have fallen, but not they individually ; and there is always the recollection of the wild excite- ment of the last rush forward, the hoarse roar of cheering from thousands of throats, that brings home to them what it means to be one with a " crowd " and feel its irresistible forward impulse, to be remembered and talked over.^

With the men of the intelligence we now obtain it would seem to me easy to find a way out of our diffi- . culties, provided our officers are saturated by educa- tion with the true spirit of the old time fighting, and understand that bloodshed is a necessary consequence of a;ll armed encounters, and that the degree of it de- pends finally on the skill with which the supreme Com- mander prepares the way for the final decision. Then we can go back to the fundamental proposition on which aU the old drill-books were based, viz., that all

^ The real reason why both in the oavahy and infsintry the prac- tice of charging in peace fell into disuse was because during the long peace after Waterloo promotion became very slow, and the officers grew too old and infirm tokeeptheirleadiufrontof the men; they got jostled about by young excited recruits, and very naturally disliked it very much. Some twenty-five years ago it was con- sidered by many cavalry officers as a quite unheard-of thing to prac- tise the " charge," as they said it unsteadied the horses, whereas the only way to " steady " the horses is to make them gallop to- gether so constantly that they find nothing unusual about the process to get excited about.

INTRODUCTION xxi

prescribed movements can be carried out on the battle field, that it rests with the judgment of the ~ leader which one to employ in each case as it arises, and that absolute obedience must be rendered to him, because he alone can overlook the whole situation; at any rate no one else can be in an equally good position to do so.

Then bring home to them the peculiarities of the fighting best adapted for each of the successive stages of a great battle. The careful preliminary skirmishing — to cover the advance to the first fire position — the fire preparation in each of its successive stages, and lastly, the final assault, rally and pursuit, when by a combination of artillery and infantry fire the fire su- periority has been definitely acquired. The men are quite intelligent enough to appreciate the difference in their leading each of these stages requires, and would enjoy their camps very much more if each ended up with a httle excitement, and above all the concentra- tion of reaUy formidable masses. No one who has taken part in the rush of 10,000 men is likely to forget the sensation.

This is the real cause of the extraordinary popularity of the great manoeuvres on the Continent. In antici- pation every one dreads the terrible fatigues and the downright suffering often entailed on the men by the tremendous marching, but it all vanishes in the glow of enthusiasm evoked by the final charges on the last days ; and the men march back to their quarters or their homes, proud of the fatigues they have overcome, and stni throbbing with the excitement of the last few hours. I have seen it both in France, Germany and

xxii INTRODUCTION

England, and it is indeed a well-established psychological fact.

In conclusion, let me call attention to the genesis of this little book in my own mind. I spent the early years of my life in Germany, in districts which had been repeatedly overrun by the French Armies, and heard from the lips of the the survivors — sufficiently numerous in the early sixties of the last century — what the great struggle for German liberation had meant to them. In J893 I began collecting material for a study of the period, but learning in Berhn that the whole of the Archives were then being investigated by the General Staff with a view to the preparation of an authoritative history of those times, I abandoned my plan for the moment ; and only resumed it again lately when the reorganization of our own forces, and the discussion which has grown up in connexion with it, seemed to me to render it advisable to call attention to what has been done under pressure of necessity by other nations, and to show the kind of heroism of which troops fighting for their very existence have been capable of in the not far distant past. Death was the same in those days as jt„.is, .JLOW^ and wounds many times worse.l-_whilst. the losses from disease and privation were greatCTb;^^fa|r lhajr'a^"weTaTC"IiLad'to~Sacounter ol recent years, except in the Bast. Yet these raw levies, averaging less service than our own militia and volunteers, as they actually stood a few weeks ago, sufficed by their self-devotion to completely neutralize and defeat the greatest concentration and perhaps the finest tactical feat of the greatest General of modern times. Want of space prevents my including a complete bibliography of

INTRODUCTION xxiii

the whole period dealt with, and, moreover, it can be found in many other places already ; but the following are the most recent works on the subject, and are those which I have more particularly followed : —

Geschichte der Novel Armee im Jahre, 1813. ^enl.

von Quistorp. Geschichte des Fruhjahrsfeldzuges, 1813. General von

HoUeben. 1904. Geschichte des Herbstfeldzuges, 1813. Maior Fried- rich. 19Q5. KriegsgeschichtUche Einzehtudien herausgegeben vom

qrossen Genemlstahe. VrkundUche Beibrdge und Forschungen zwt Geschichte des Preussischen Heeres. (iafiBfiialsliabO Bautien. fin1„ fynnparb, "Pffn's, ^ftOI La Manoeuvre de iMzen. Col, de Lanrezac. V Education Militaire de Napoleon. Colin, Paris, 1901.

'. ^jlA'TVAX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

GiriBEET Pebdicts the Advent op Napoleon, v — ^What

WAS THE SeOBET OF HIS POWBB ? vi — ClAUSBWITZ FAILED TO SHED LXQHT ON IT, vii — ITS OtITLINB BECONSTRtTCTBD

FROM Napoleon's Co^ispondence, by French General Staff, 1895-1905, vii — A Psychological Problem of Extreme Interest in Campaign of 1813 .... xiii

:. s CHAPTER I

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813

The Ethical Eight of a Nation to exist, 3 — ^Wherb MiLiTAEY Theory fails, 3-4 — ^What the Student shotjld know, 4 — fundamental conception of Strategy, 4-5 — Frederick the Great's Oblique Order, 5 — ^The Austrians become more cautious, 6— The Echelon Attack, 6 — ^Excellence of each Unit OF Greater Value than Superior Numbers, 7 — Essentials of a Mobile Army, 7 — Frederick the Great's Disregard of them after I^ossbace, 7 — Magnetic Quality of Great Commanders, 8— gAusa OF Prussian Decline, 8 — System op Eecruitino in Eighteenth Century, 9 — ^Rbvoluhonaby Propaganda IN Prussia, 10 — ^Ruchel's Speech, 10 — Causes of Defeats nv vmr. AT.T.nta 11 — SoHAENHOEST and the

XXV

xxvi TABLE OF CONTENTS

•H

PAGE

SpnaT OF THE " Nation m Asms," 11— Absence of this Spirit KUiNED Phussla, 12 — Foundation of an Officer's Training, 12— CompuI/SORY Service, and Knbsb- bbck's Memobandtjm, 12-13 — Frederick the Great's . Speech at Potsdam, 13-14 — Co^gsmoN_OF_ARMY_AT_ Jena, 15 — Defects of Divisional Organization, 16 — Battle of Jena, 17 — Reason why Frederick the Great's Army ceased to exist, 17 — ^Aftbb Conse- quences of Jena, 18 — Prussian Generals, Fear of Eesponsibility, 18 — False Humanitarianism, 19 — Von der Goltz's " Von Jena bis Prbussischb Eylau," 19 — schabnhorst and blttcher's attitude, 20 — ^frederick William IV and the Russians, 20 — After the Treaty

OF Tilsit, 21 — Soharnhorst's Scheme the Startino

III ~— ^«^™-^»™»

PflgcsT_ OF Modern^Gbrman^Army, 21 — Soharnhorst's Scheme {eon.), 22 — Contusion of Reformers, 22 — Soharn- horst's Idea of a National Guard, 23 — Efforts of Reformers to circumvent Napoleonic Decree, 23 — Custom of " Krumpebs," 23 — ^Napoleon's Attempt to force Was. between Prussia and Russia, 24 — His Threat to occupy Prussia forces Alliance between Prussia and France, 25 — ^Nucleus of New Prussian Army 25

■A CHAPTER n

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813

.§X§™M_0F RBORUmNO UNTIL THB_REV0LUT10N^ 29^PIRIT

OF French Army until 1812, 29-30^ourdan's Law 0F~ Conscription, 30 — The Central Feature of Napo- leonio^Warfare and the Conclusions drawn from it, 30-r31— Composition of Grand Army, 1812, 31— The " Cohorts," 31 — ^Napoleon and the Contingents of 1808-9-10, 32 — Provisional Battalions, their

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxvii

Dbili. aud Maeching, 33— State of the Abtiixeby,

CAVAUtY AND Staff, 33 — Taotioal EVOLTJTIOy, 34 —

Gbowth op the Army Corps, 35 — The Best Gttabantbb FOB Effioteitcy, 35 — Dbcentbauzatiom' of Commaitd, AiTD EKQSMQ-gaJEcogOHy ^ TmB, 35-36 — Essential Factors of Cayaijsy TBAiNiNa, 36 — Differbnoe between I^bderick the Great and Napoleon, 36 — Napoleon's Mtt.ttaby Education, 36-37 — French Mtu-

TARY AuTHOEITIBS IN HIS TOTJTH, AND THEIR LEADINO

Characteristics, 37-38 — ^Thb Fbactioe of the Eiqh- TBBNTH Century, 38 — The Ulm Campaign, 39 — ^Why Napoleon cbitshbd Mack, 39 — ^Austbrutz and its Lesson, 39 — " The Independent Will Powbb of the Adversary," 40 — Reason fob Napoleon's " Bat- talion Square," 40 — The Attack and the " Fixed Point," 41 — ^The Tactical Errors of the Prussians, 41 — " Win the Battle First," 42 — General Concep- tion OF Strategical Man(euveino, 42-^Characteristio of Napoleon's System, 42 — ^Its Importance, 43 — Strength of the Old Revolutionary Army, 43 — ^Thb ^MT OF the Fbenct Infantry aftbb Pol^jp, 43 — Napoleon's BAT-n-E Tactics. 43 — ^Napoleon and " Human Sympathy," 44 — TTta Instinct that the " Battle was BiPE," 44 — ^Association of Infantry and ARiniBRY IN Permanent Divisions, 44 — The Cavalry of the Allies in 1813, 44 — ^Napoleon's Fall into Over-Con- FiDBNCE, 45 — Note, Charge of the Rhattob Horse . 45

CHAPTER III

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR

Thb Wreck of thb Grand Abmy, 49 — Napoleon in Paris, Dboembeb 19, 1812, 49— The Empeeob's Orders to

d

xxviii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE DAVO-&T, 50 — RliPOBT OF THE Q.M.6. OF KONIQSBBBQ

ON Napoleon's beaten Abmy, 50 — Convention ov Tatjeogqen, 51 — ^Yoeok's Subebndbb as told in Von Wranqel's Memoirs, 51 — ^The late Emperor Wn,- liam's Letter of May 15, 1869, gives another Vbbsion op the Surrender, 52 — Delight of Prussia, 53 — Chae-

AOTBR OF THE KiNO OF PRUSSIA, 53 — REFORMS OF STEIN

AND Hardenbbbg, 54 — ^Napoleon's Opinion of Yobck's Action, 54 — ^Testimony of Clausewitz regarding Yorok's Action, 55 — ^The King leaves Beblin fob Bbeslau, 55 — His Letter to Napoleon re Treaty Obligations, 56 — ^Meeting of Estates of East Prussia at konigsbebq, 65-56— frederick william and the Russians, 56 — ^Difficulties of Prussian Reorganiza- tion, 57 — Schaenhoest's Plan for a Landwehr, 58 — King's Permission to form Volunteer Corps, 59 — LtJtzow Free Corps, 59 — Foreign Battalion " Von Reusz," 59 — ^Volunteer Rbplbs, " Von Reiohb," 59 — Hellwig's Partisan Cavalry, 59 — ^Von Schill's Hussars, 59 — State of Troops at End of March, 60 — Prussians alive to Necessity for Personal Servicb, 60-61 — The Chief Differencb between Feancb and Germany re Civil and Military Administbation, 61 — England's Response to Thbeat of Invasion, 61 — ^Failure of Tugbndbund to bouse True Pateiotism, 61 — Difficulty of fdiding New Officebs

FOE THE FOECES, 62— gUPPLY OF WiE^PONS AND_gUN3,

62 — ^Maewitz on Real Secebt of Excellence of Old Febdbriokian Cavalry, 63 — English SuBsiDgs, 63 — The Russians, 63 — The Grand Army, 64 — ^Murat hands his Command over to Pbjnoe EuoSine, 64 — The Grand Abmy {con.), 65 — Re ynier's Corps — Durutte — Schwabt- zbnbeeg's Command, 66 — ^Peince EuoJine oeganizbs his FouB Divisions, 65 — PBicfOB Eugene's Retreat to

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxix

PAQB

Fbaukfobt, 65 — ^Napoleon's Letter to EuaiiNE, 65 — The Old School op Steatboists and Napoleon's Depiancb op thbib Theoetbs, 65-67 — ^Napoleon's Comments on the Abandonment op Beblin, 67-68 — ExtqJsnb has Little Choice op Line op Retreat, 69 — Emperor's Reproaches apter his Report, 69 — Napoleon on the Defence op the Elbe, 70-72 — EuoiiNE's Mistake in withdrawing Davo'&t prom Hamburg, etc., 72 — Napoleon's Opinion thereon, 72 — Emperor's Plan Adopted, (73 — ^Alarming News prom Hamburg, 73 — ^Napoleon's Reproof to EttgJinb, 73 — Combat op M6ckbrn, 74 — ^The Allies' Sttccess, 74 — Contrast op EuaiiNE's and Napoleon's Action and Orders, 75 — Viceroy moves to Lower Saale, 76 — The Allies call a Halt for Improvement op Com- munications, 76 — ^Rumour op Napoleon's Advance startles them into Activity 76

CHAPTER IV

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD— CONCENTRATION OF GRAND ARMY— OPERATIONS TO BATTLE OF LUTZEN

Composition op Grand Army, 79-80 — The I Corps, 80 — The II Corps, 81— The III Corps, 82— The IV Corps, 82 —The V Corps, 83— The Vt Corps, 83— The VII Corps, 84— Thb XI Corps, 84,— The XII Corps, 85— The Guards (Morties), 85— The Cavalry, 86— The Em- peror's Army on May 1, 1813, 86-87— ExraAORDiNiUtY Results of UNPRomsiNa Matemal, 87 — ^Momke's Definition of the Art of War, 88 — ^Napoleon plans A Raid on Bebun, 88 — Chief Criticisms against this — Emfbrob's Reason foe abandohinq the Idea, 89 — Action op the Alues, 90 — Positions on April 11,

XXX TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

1813, 91 — Orders foe CoNCBNTEATioif, 91 — Napoleon's Careful REcoNiifAissANCES, 92 — Cavalry Raids by THE Allies, 93 — ^Napoleon's Orders. 94 — -BERTm^j EijgraDA3TON__0F jraEM,_94 — Supply Service, 94 — ^Napo- leon's liETTBB TO DUROO, 95 — COMMUNICATIONS (LDSTES

or), 95— BLENCH Positions, April 30, 1813, 96— Napo- leon's Expedient to Compensate fob Deficiency op Cavalry, 96 — ^Napoleon's Orders, May 1, 1813, 97 — Cavalry of Allies repulsed, 98 — Emperor at LtJTZEN, May 1, 98 — Comments on the Emperor's Disposition OF HIS Troops fob Battle of Lutzbn, 99 — The Battle OF LtJTZEN, 100 — Emperor's Orders on the Battle- field,' 100 — Movements of the Allies, 101-102 — Orders of the Allied Generals on May 1, 1813, 102- 103 — Comments, 103 — ^Attack by the Allies, 103 — Prussians carry Gross Gorschen, 104 — Napoleon ON ^B.JBuTLBmLp, 104-^Hig, Effect on the Troops, 104-105 — Charges of Cavalry and Cossacks on Marmont's Infantry, 105 — Napoleon's BeKjY to

RBQTTBJT_F0R^_ItemFOEgB^NTS, 105 — 'JhB^^ObISOAL

Moment for Napoleon, 106 — The Emperor raijlibs jps TRopps, 106 — ^Napoleon's Psychological Influence AND Heroism of French Troops, 106 — ^Napoleon's De- cisive Attack, 106 — ^Retreat of the Allied Cavalry, 107 — Comments on the Conduct of the Prussians at Jena and LStzen, 107 — Coolness and Courage of Prussian Army at LtJtzen, 108 — The Blow to the Imperial Prestige, 108 — ^Thb EtGHinsra Quality of the French Troops, 108 — Comments on the Battle, 109— I^,Fundambntal Conception of the Old Linh Tactics, 110 — The Letter of THE^^RESjgRVBs " Fqbm sssut RULES, lll^teB EssENfflEOFTHEjEHOLE. Master,. Ill — ^Losses as oompabbd to Seven Years' War . 111-112

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxi

FAOB

CHAPTER V

FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE

The Allies decide to oontinub Retreat, 115 — Feenoh nr PTTEStnT, 115 — Obdbe dtj Joub, May 6, 1813, 116 — The Viceroy's Incurable Slowuess, 116 — ^Abuse of Pbivate Tbauspobt, 117 — Empbeor's Letter to Prince EtroiiNE (The Viceroy) amee Colditz, May 4, 117 — Reports received on Night or May 4, 118 — ^A New Army under Ney, 118 — ^Thb Empbeob oottnts on Saxon Co-opbbation, 119 — ^Allies contest French Advance, 119 — French Army enter Dresden, 119 — Rate oe Marching op Feench Teoops, 120 — Passage OF the Elbe, 120 — Affair of Neustadt, 121 — Passage AT Briesnitz, 121 — ^KiNQ OF Saxony's Oedee to Thiel- man at Toegatt, 121 — Occupation of Toesau by French, 122 — ^Retreat of the Allies, 122 — ^Napoleon's Order

to PMNCE EuGiSNB TO START FOR ITALY, 123 — ThE

Aemy OF THE Elbe broken up, 123 — Composition of Grand Army on May 15, 1813, 123-124 — Dresden as a Base, 125 — Routes de L'ABMiiE, 125 — Comments taken FROM Col. Lanrbzao on the Situation, 125 — Pursuit OF the Allies, 126 — The Emperor's Letter to Ney, 126 — Comments on Ney's Orders, 127 — ^Action at Wbissig near Stolpen, 127 — Russians withdraw to blschofswbeda, 127 — disposition of iv and vi coeps, 128 — French Dlffioultibs of Supply, 128 — Cossack Raids, 128 — Oedbes for May 14, 1813, 129 — Instruc- tions to Ney, 129 — Beethibb's Mistake about Napo- leojt's Oedee to Ney, 130— ;^a.^M?EE0E., issues Contradictoby Oedbes to Nby, 130 — Position of Nby's Teoops"on Moening of May 18, 131— Napoleon's Lettbb to Beethiee on May 18, 131— Comment, 13^133 — Counter Attack by the Allies, 133 — Ney saved by

xxxii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Obdebs to Maboh on Klix, 1 34 — ^Napoleon beoonnoitees Bautzen, 134 — Disposition of Allies' Teoops, 134^135 — The Empeeoe's DuFicirLT Problem, 135 — His Obdebs FOR THE Battle of Bautzen, 136^Battle op Bautzen, 137 — Slackening of Prussian Resistance, 138 — Napoleon's Order for Final Advance, 138 — ^The Allies' Opportunity, 138 — Napoleon's Second Failuee, 138 — The French Pursuit, 139 — Rbyniee asks fob a Halt, 140 — Death of Dueoc, 140 — Dissensions among THE Allies, 140 — The Surprise of Haynau, 141 — The Armistice, 141 — Comments ..... 142-144

CHAPTER VI

THE ARMISTICE— FRENCH PREPARATIONS FOR THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGN

The French Army in August, 147 — " Les Rbpeaotaibes " (note), 147 — Composition of the French Army at the Close op Armistice, 148 — Garrisons of Elbe Foe- TBESSES, 149 — Second Line Teoops, 149 — Garrisons op Fortresses in Poland and Germany, 149 — Quality OF THE Troops, 149 — Armies op the Allies, 150 — The Pbusslan Aemy, 151 — The Landwehb, 151 — Obganiza- TioN OF Landwehb, 162-153 — Russian Abmy, 153 — The Austeian Army, 154 — The Field States in August, 1813, 154 — The Swedish Contingent, 155 — The Anglo- Gebman Continqbnt, 155 — Note on Stamina of Teoops standing up to Heavy Losses, 155 — The Mecklenburg

CONTINQENT, 156 — ThE COMMAND OP THE ALLIED AeMIES,

156 — Field-Marshal Prince Schwabzbnbbeg, 157

Chief op Staff Radbtzsky, 157 — Langbnau's Effect ON Conduct op Operations, 167 — Comments, 158

MORBAU AND JOMINI, 158— BLiJOHEE, 159— YORCK, 160

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxiii

FAGS

— Langbeon, 160 — Saoken, 160 — Bbenadottb, 161 — Agreement of Trachtbnbeeq, 161 — ^Its Caeddjal Pbotciple, 161 — ^Napoleon's Elans, 162-163 — Comments,

163 — ^MaBMONT'S IiBTTEE TO NaPOLEON, 164 — I^ENOH

Positions on Conolitsion oe Abmistice, 164-165 — The Situation from Standpoint os Stbatbgical Criticism, 165 — ^Napoleon's Reply to St. Cyb, 165 — Comments, 166 — Magnitude of the Alubs' Decision, 166 — Night of August 11, 1813, 166 — Order of Battle of the Allied Armies, 167-170 — Comments . . 171-172

CHAPTER VII

KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM

Blucheb's Reason fob iNFBiNGiNa the Lbttbe of Abmis- tice, 176 — Prussia breaks the Tbuob, 176— Want of. Experience in Prussian Staff, 176— Bluchbr and Gnbisenau, 176— Blucher's Retreat, 176 — ^Yohok's Complaint to the King, 177 — Blucher's Position, 177 — ^Lesson drawn feom Battle of Katzbach (note) 177 — Rising of Katzbach River favours Blucher, 177-8 — ^Napoleon on Intebiob Lines, 178 — Position of his Troops a Model foe All Timb, 178 — Disadvantages of the " Defensive," 178 — Reason foe Napoleon's Desibino Advance against LBiFzfo, 179 — Oeder to Maodonald, 179 — Disadvan- tages of Imperfectly Trained Staff, 179 — Napoleon retuens to GtOELiTZ, 179 — ^Plans of the Alubs, 180 — Discussion of Heads of Allibd Cobps, 180 — Bohemian Abmy changes Dibection, 181 — The Allied Monarchs

AND PeINCE SoHWARZENBERG ABOVE RaCKNITZ LONO

Discussion, 181 — ^Time bequibed to draft Orders AFTER Decision, and Comment, 181-182 — Effect of

xxxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS

Napoleon's Abbival at Dresden, 182 — ^Mystery of Signal Gun eob Attaokinq Dresden, 182 — ^Napoleon AT GoBLiTz, 182 — Contact with Bohemian Advance ON May 22, 182 — ^Napoleon's Views on the Situation AND Orders to Macdonald and St. Cyb, 183 — Calls UP the Guards — Letter to St. Cyb, 183 — Letter to RoQNiAT, Chief Enoinebr, 183 — Letter to Van- DAMME, May 23, 184 — ^Napoleon's Great Design, 184 — ^Letter to Marbt in Paris, 184 — ^Ridbs to Bautzen AND Stolpbn, 185 — Unwelcome News at Stolpbn, 183 — First Overt Act betraying Spirit of his German

CONTINOENT, 185 — OrDBBS TO DISMOUNT WeSTPHALIAN

Cavalry, 186— Gourgaud's News from Dresden, 186 — Napoleon's Resolution fails, 186 — Ebtubns ,to Dbbsden, 186^0ne of thb most Rbmabkable Marches

ONjREOfflRD, 186 — EXTRAORDINABILY GoOD PbRFOEM^ ANCE OF THB YOUNG !PbENCH CONSCRIPTS, 187 — BATTLE

OF Dresden, 187 — ^Napoleon's Arrangement for Great

COUNTERSTROKB AGAINST ALLIES, 188 — ItS BfFEOT

only Local, 188 — Napoleon's Letter to CAMSAoiiREs, 189 — ^His Fear fob Macdonald, 189 — ^Napoleon's

Pursuit, 190 — Suffebings of Allied Abmibs, 190

Vandamme at Pibna, 190 — ^Vandamme defeats EUGiiNE of Wubtbmbbbg on the Elbe, 190 — ^Macdonald'S Defeat at Katzbaoh, 191 — Escape of the Allies, 191 — Duke EuoiiNE and Osteemann, 191 — Ostbbmann's

OBSTQfAOY, 191 — ^EZNG OF PRUSSIA TURNS OSTEriittANN

BACK TO Pribsten, 192 — The Tsar also grasps Danger

OF the Allies and helps them to avoid Defeat, 192

Oollorbdo's Austrian Corps, 193 — The Battle of KviM, 193 — Capture of Vandamme and his Staff, 194 — ^Kleist's Corps and their Fortunate Intbevbntion AT THE Battle of Kulm, 194— Comments . .195-200

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxv

CHAPTER Vni PA0K

GROSS BEEREN— DENNEWITZ— WARTENBURG

Bkfobt ibom Oudinot, 203 — ^Napoleon's Notes on the Situation, 203 — ^Napoleon's Resolve to Maeoh on Beblot, 204 — ^Napoleon hears of Disaster at Kulm, 204 — Baron Pain's Dbsobiption of Napoleon's Recep- tion OF THIS News, 205 — ^Von Geksdobf's Comment on Napoleon, 203 — ^Movement on Berlin Suspended, 206 — Obdbbs to Maodonald and Ney, 206 — Pbepajba- TioN OF Troops about Dresden to meet Allied Offen- sive, 206^Obdkbs to St. Cyb, Viotob, Dukes of Ragusa, Tbeviso, and Latoub-Mauboubg, 206 — Lobau com- mands Vandammb's Wbecked Corps, 206 — Napoleon

DECIDES on HoOERSWERDA AS A CENTRAL POSITION, 206

— Orders to Ney, 206 — ^Necessity for Rapid Action, 206 — Comments on Above, 206 — ^Ney's Movements, 209 — Battle of Dennewitz, 209 — Tauentzien and

his IiAIfDWEHB, THEIR LESSON TO US, 209 — ^NeY AND

Oudiwot-^^ffect of Latter' s Personal Bad Temper — ^Its Punishment, 210 — Ney's Command ceases to Exist, 211 — Napoleon's Obdebs to Romtiat, abb__

MaSTEBPIEOES, ^O his lNSTBUCTipNSJCO_ST;J>B, 211 —

Napoleon joins Macdonald, 211 — Napoleon at Bautzen, 212 — His Euey with Sebastiaiti, 212 — Blu'Cheb bbtbeats on Lobau, 213 — ^Napoleon Returns TO Dresden, 213 — Comments, 213-214 — ^Napoleon's Order to the Army at Bautzen,] 214 — Emperor dissatisfied with Intelligence Service, 215 — The Bohemian Army, 215 — Cost of Abortive Expedition, 215 — Breakdown ,_0F French Commissariat, 216 — ' Briqandaqb of Cossacks, 216— Results of Allied Vic- tobies AT Kulm — Gboss Beebbn, Katzbaoh, 216 — MoNABOHs' Caix ON Blttchbb, 217 — ^Want of Oboanized AuuxD Co-OPBBATioN, 217 — Bbbnadotte, 217 — Comment,

xxxvi TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAOE 218 — BlUCHER'S AtTTOQBAPH LETTER TO KtJESBBBCK

(Teanslation dt Note), 218 — Liliensteist's Verbal Instbtjctions, 219 — Problem of Bernadotte's Con- DtrcT, 219 — UsruER-ouBEBNTS of Intriotje in Allied Armies, 220 — Bohemian Army advances, 220 — Ritmoub OE Napoleon's Advance against Blucheb, 220-221 — Allied HEADguABiERs' Amazinq Request, 221^-Napo- LEON REJOINS Si. Cye, 221 — ^Napolbon on the Geibrs- BEEG, 221 — French Reconnaissances on the Eve op Contemplated Battle op Teplitz, 221 — ^Impossi- bility OT_MAN(EUVRINa HIS AsTILLERy, 222 — COMMENTS,

222 — ^Napoleon's Obdbrs prom Dresden, 223^ Bernadotte, 223 — Renewed Advance op Bohemian Aemy, 224 — Napoleon's Reconnoitring from Nollen- DOEF ON September 17 and 18, 1813, 224 — Obders to Guards — His Return to Pirn a, 224 — ^Austrians

iSUEPEISE AND OAPTUEE FbBIBEEG, 224 — CONDITION OP THE Fbench Tboops Deploeablb, 225 — ^Napoleon's Losses in Men, Ammunition and Matbeial, 225 — Napoleon eetuens to Debsden, Septembee 21, 225 — Joins Macdonald on 22nd, 226— Positions op Feench Aemy on Septembee 27, 226-227^Empeeor Reorga- nizes Army, 227 — Decree op September 27, 1813, 227 —Orders to Mueat, 228— Comments, 228— Onj,,^avb Dbpbot op .IJapolbon's Masteelx.Dispositions,-228 — Blucher's Movements, 228-229— One op Blttchbr's Bedrock Facts, 229— Novelty of Silesian Army's Maech deceives Napoleon, 229— Blucher's Maeoh Undisturbed, 230 — Attempts to force the Passage of THE Elbe by the Allies, 230— Bbrtrand's Provision for Defence and his Mistakes, 230 — Prussian Ignor- ance of the Country, 230— Fighting across the Elbe, 231 — Prussians find Unsuspected Fords and TURN French Right, 231— State op Yoeck's Corps . 231

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxyii

FAOB

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII Strength op Febnch Army, end of September, 1813 . 233-234

CHAPTER IX

LEIPZIG

Positions op the Silesian Army — The North Army (Bbr- nadottb) — The Bohemian Army's Strength — Napo- leon at Brbsdbn, his War Strength, 237— Comments. 237 — Defects of Dresden Position, 238 — ^Napoleon's Orders to the Troops, 238 — Napoleon's Letter to Mabmont (October 7), 239 — ^Napoleon's Orders to St. Cyr, 239 — Napoleon's CotmTER Order to St. Cye, 240 — Comments, 240 — Bltjcher and Bernadottb, 241 — Their Determination to march on Leipzig, 241 — Orders to Sackbn, Langeron and Yorck, 241 — Thb North Army, 242 — Danger op Napoleon's Lea vino Dresden dawns upon the Allies, 242 — Allied Head- quarters discuss Emergencies, 242 — Blucheb — Bernadottb — Von Ltlibnstein, Interview between Bernadottb and Von Lilienstbin, 243 — Bernadottb suggests both Abmibs rbvbrt to Saale Position, 244 — Bluoher accedes — Silbsian Army escapes Napo- leon, 244 — Bad Scouttng of French Cavalry, 244 — Napoleon's Orders for October 11, 1813, 244 — Orders half EXEgCTJa-^RY Half-starved Troops, 245-^omments, 245-247 — Napoleon's Concentration on Leipzig, 247 — His Note to Marmont, October 12, 247 — ^His Doubt as to Tenability op Murat's Position, 248 — The Silbsian Army -r- Signs op Bbrnadottb's Anxiety m Correspondence with Bluchbr, 248 — Bernadottb loses his Head after Ney's Attack on Dessau, 249 — The Consequence of this Aberration,

xxxviii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

249 — Blttoher's Coolness — His Opposition Plans, 249 — Beenadottb follows Blijcher's Lead, 249 — The Bohemian Abmy, 250 — Schwabzenberg's Recon- NAiSANCE and Obdbbs, 250t-Stobm evoked by his Obdee, 250 — Battle oe Leipzig inevitablb, 250 — Wittgenstein's Reconnaisanob, 250 — The Action OE Libbertwolkwitz, 251 — Mtjbat's Geeat Cavalby Chaeqes, 251 — Reason why Napoleon took vv Deeec-.^ tive Position eob Battle of Leipzig, 251 — Schwabzen- bebg's Oedees foe Battle, 251 — Exteaoedinaey Effect of Rblyino on Langbnatj's Local Knowledge OF Gboond, 251 — Defects of the Disposition of Allied Teoops, 252 — Peotest of Russian Staff, 252 — The Empeboe Alexandbb's Interview with Schwabzbn- ebrg, 252 — Alexander's Disposition of Russian Forces, 252 — ^Napoleon's Abeival at Leipzig, 253 — ■ Pboblem of Schwabzbnbeeg's Conduct — His Lbttee TO HIS Wife, 253 — Contrast between Napoleon and

SoHWAiRZENBBRG, 254 — BaTTLB OF LEIPZIG, 254 —

Typical Piece of Bad Staff Management, 255 — NAP0LEqN];s^lNSTRUC33;QNS..TO^ Berthiee, 255 — The Moment of the Attack, 255 — Accounts of First Engagements read like Early Battles of 1870, 256 — Maodonald's Corps, 256 — Bordesoullb's Cavalry Chaegb, 256 — Countee Attack by Allied Cavalby, 256 — French Squadeons charge to the Rescue, 257 — The Austrian Attack on Connewitz, 257 — The Reason of Napoleon's Defeat, 257 — Comments, 257 — Patbiotio Enthusiasm of At,t,ted~Armib3, 258 — ^Night AFTER the Battle, 258 — Battle of Mockern, 259 — Maemont's Defeat, 259 — Desobiption of Battle, 260 — Comments, 260-261 — Napoleon's ^laCDNeBEoaow— of

JjYUTiM^S__POTITION,^_261r:7REASOgS^ FOB NaPOLEON's

Dbosion _io. resume the Battle on^ TffiSLJJSi^ISB^^-

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxix

PEBmnNABT Attempt to bbopbn Diplomatic Rela- tions, 262 — Allies' Refttsal — Bltjoher's Attack on NoBTH-wEST of Leipzio, 262 — Disposition of Napo- leon's Troops, 262 — Ootobee 16, 1813, 263 — Strength OF French Army, 263 — ^Vicissitudes of the Struggle, 263 — Napoleon sends out Orders fob Retbeat by Linden AU, 11 a.m., October 18, 263-264 — ^Thb Allies CABBY Leipzig by Stobm, October 19, 264 — Comments, 264-267 — Why Napoleon lost the Campaign of 1813, 267 — ^Necessity of Studying the very Soul of a Nation, 267 — Comments, 268-269 — Test by which the Pate of Nations is decided 270

TABLE OF CONTENTS xli

LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS

1. Napoleon's C!oncbnteation on the Saale, \ / *\

AKD Movements to Battle of LtStzen, Mat 2, 1813 . . . .

2. Napoleon's Concbntbation on Bautzen, May

21 and 22, 1813, AND PuBsriT to date op Abmistice

3. Operations prom end of Abmistioe to end

OP August, 1813

4. CJONCBNTEATION OF ALLIES ON LEIFZIO IN OCTO-

1

6. Diagram of Napoleon's Movements, August- October, 1813

6. Diagram op Napoleon's Man<euvbes at Jena,

October 12 and 13, 1806

7. Battle of Dresden, August 26 and 27, 1813

8. Battle op Lutzen, May 2, 1813

9. Battle op Bautzen, May 20 and 21, 1813 . 10. Battle op Leipzig, October 16, 1813 . . /

■3

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813

CHAPTER I

The Prussian Army in 1813

In the struggle for the survival of the fittest amongst the Nations, ever in progress around us, and of which " War " is the name we apply to its most intense mani- festation, the battlefield is the last Court of Appeal. Its decision is for the time being final, and it is right that it should be so, for each Army as it stands facing the other is the ultimate expression of the ethical right of the Nation it represents to continue to exist. Its numbers reflect the spirit of its race, its skill the sense of duty guiding that spirit, and its equipment in every detail reveals the standard of probity guiding the daily relations of its individual units. Is the Nation high- spirited ? then its soldiers will be numerous and wilhng ; is its sense of duty high ? they will be well trained, well led, and ready to die at their Commander's word ; is the standard of honesty high, then they wiU be well fed, and there will be no cartridges loaded with saw- dust in their pouches, and no brown paper soles on their boots.

History sufficiently proves the truth of these ele- mentary propositions and their converse, and it is pre- cisely because military theory has so consistently neglected them in the past that its conclusions for so

THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

long have failed to commend themselves to the common- sense of our coimtrjmien, whose own evolution has impressed upon them, often with dramatic intensity, the absurdity of the contention that the fate of Nations can be reduced to a question of the relations of angles, bases and the counting of heads.

For this reason the student of a campaign should set himself to acquire, as a first step in his task, as com- plete a knowledge as possible of the nature of the two contending forces, and the circumstances which con- ditioned their growth. It is not enough to be able to write down with accuracy the exact number of men, horses and guns each Commander may have had avail- able at a particular time or place ; the essential thing is to reaUze whether, having regard to the composition and previous history of his command, the General had a right to expose his men at that time and place to the risks which hostile colKsion invariably entails. Funda- driven two Armies of approximate mental equaUty marching to meet one another from

rfTf^ate^P^"^^^®^ ^^^^ (*^<^ ^* ^^ always the first care of a General to make his base parallel to that of his adversary, whatever the relations' of the imaginary lines indicating his frontier may be,) then neither can manoeuvre so as to threaten his adversary's communications without exposing his own, nor can he endeavour to surroimd his enemy without running the risk of seeing his own Army cut in two. One risk or the other, one or both Commanders must accept to bring about a result at all, but the result alone decides whether or not they were justified in accepting the risk.

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 5

This result, however, depends, as akeady pointed out, on the relative fighting value of the two Armies, and since this relation may vary from year to year, even from hour to hour, it is sufficiently apparent that every human being will seek to guarantee himself against the chance of proving mistaken in his estimate by discovering some method which wiU ensure a suffi- cient margin of superior force (moral, material or nu- merical) at a point of his own selection. -

If his enemy will only remain perfectly stiU, as he does, for instance, in a permanent fortress, or in less degree in an entrenched position, the solution is simple and can be applied with almost unfailing regularity time after time, as in the formal attack of an old- fashioned fortress in Vauban's days. But the matter assxunes a totally different aspect when the enemy is free to move also, and the difficulty increases till it becomes insurmountable when your adversary can maintain an average rate of speed about twice as great as your own.

Now this is precisely what occurred during the Great's t^^ period of hostilities which culminated

Oblique in the Seven Ye.ars' War. The Prussians, handled by a single resolute man respon- sible to no one but himself, gained the time their adver- saries spent in making up their minds, and devoted it to marching. As the whole ethical standard of their Nation was intrinsically high, the King could exact a correspondingly higher standard of training and discip- line from his men, hence when the two Armies met numerical superiority was no longer required along the whole front of battle, but the result could be

THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

obtained by local superiority only. This was the origin of Frederick the Great's " obUque " order, and when once a succession of victories had been won by the Prussians, because they kept the spirit of this form before their minds' eyes, (in practice the letter was never quite realised), the Austrians became more and more cautious, and taking to entrenchments to avoid the risk of surprise always threatening them through the greater mobility of the Prussians, the task of the latter became ever easier until the idea was stereotyped throughout their Army, that it was the form of the manoeuvre which decided, and not the fighting.

This idea brought others, equally detrimental to true efficiency, in its train. The success of the manoeuvres ultimately depended on the superior fighting quality of that body of troops which came first into contact with the enemy. If, for instance, the Austrians at A. shot

yAUSTRIANS.

straighter and faster than their assailants, the latter's

line would be broken through, no matter what its length

(or in other words, its numbers), and through this gap

The cavalry might pour and work what mis-

fechelon chief it pleased. To remedy this the idea

of the " Echelon " arose, for in this formation

it is evident that the_units not jjirgnjjyaflectej^

by^ the attack would still remain under control, and

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 7

this being an obvious improvement on the original model, it took root in the minds of the many, and became a veritable shibboleth of victory.

In either case, however, since it was clearly impossi- ble to predict in advance on which particular unit ol , the force the brunt of the fighting was to fall, it fol- lowed that the excellence of each unit in the essential task of man killing, i.e. the dehvery of the most rapid fire from the greatest number of musk§ts, and the bayo- net attack, came to be looked upon as of far greater importance in the decision than superiority of numbers.

To attain the standard of excellence held to be re- quisite to fulfil these requirements took a great deal of time, and also limited the recruiting area, for men, say of 5 ft. 2 in., were out of place in a bayonet charge. Hence the finished soldier became a most valuable article, representing, in fact, so much invested capital, and it was clearly poor economy to waste him by un- necessary hardships on the march and in bivouacs, or to impair his resisting power by subjecting him to short rations or inferior food.

Hence the idea sprang up that tents and heavy pro- vision trains were absolute essentials for a mobile Army.^

Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War never allowed himself to be hampered by any such sentiments. Wfeen, as after Eossbach (November 5, 1757), the need demanded it, he marched his men to Leuthen as light and as fast as ever did Napoleon,

' Bunjit Singh exactly hit off the prevailing sentiment when, on seeing the British Infantry after the first Sikh War in 1846, he said : " Ah, if I had such soldiers as yours, I would have every man carried to the battlefield in palanquins," to prevent their being unnecessarily fatigued before the fighting began.

8 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

living on the country as he went. But, as already mentioned, he was responsible to nobody, and possessed in addition that magnetic quality common to all Great Commanders of being able to exact the utmost from his troops without impairing their devotion to his cause. His subordinates, however, were responsible to him, a very different matter, and when after the Peaice of Hubertusberg it suited his internal policy to favour commerce and agriculture at the expense of military efiSiciency, the idea of few but efficient units, of tents and creature comforts, got completely the upper hand in the Army, and the true secret of Prussia's salvation at the crisis of Leuthen, viz., mobiUty, not the echelon attack, sank into complete obscurity. Cause of That the King's poUcy with regard to Prussian trade and industry was a necessity is ec me ^jearly evident to any one who can realize the state of destitution to which the country had been brought during these seven years of incessant strain. Unfortunately, concessions once made to trade and industries are not easily withdrawn, and though the Nation, being mainly dependent on its agriculture, recovered its wealth within seven years — agricultural countries generally do — the system which had sprung into existence in the meanwhile was continued long after the need for it had disappeared, and the efficiency of the Army, more particularly of the Cavalry, was sacrificed to a cheese-paring policy of economy, to which the worst we have ever known was comparatively spendthrift lavishness.

All this took place so gradually that it passed un- noticed by all but the keenest minds.

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 9

The system of recruiting for the Bang's leCTuTtin^ Army, (for it was the " Army of the King " and not of the Nation,) was essentially the same as our own, and had, in fact, sprung from the same feudal principles. In theory every man could be called on to serve in defence of his own district, but practically the liability had been com- muted for a money payment, with which the King maintained a voluntary Army to defend the country. Commercially it paid better to attract foreign recruits than to take the physical pick of the country (5 ft. 6 in. was the minimum height in those days) from the tillage of the fields. In a sense the raising of regiments was decentralized, each district (canton) being Hable for a certain quota of men, which it had to supply by ballot, if necessary, and as a general rule no unit was allowed to enlist more than one-third foreigners (Auslander — a term which included all except Prussian subjects), the remaining two-thirds being " LandesMnder,?' or natives, and it was the presence of these foreigners in the ranks that constituted the gravest evU. These men were easy enough to handle in War, but being long- service men far too proficient in their drill to be kept upon the parade ground, they became idle, and needed an iron hand to keep them in the necessary subjection. They were hated by the civiUans, partly for their idleness and the habits they developed as a consequence of that idleness, but chiefly because they corrupted the bulk of all the " LandesMnder -' who came to the barracks, and every town of sufficient importance to make its voice heard by the King petitioned,, and often successfully, to be exempted from their garrison, and

10 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

to have its inhabitants excused from military service. As each fresh petition was granted, the area for recruit- ing was diminished, and the rift between the soldiers and civilians, which was to prove the ruin of the country, was gradually widened.

Revolution- The natural reaction in favour of peace ary Propa- after a period_of prolonged War was at_ ^Pruiia" j^ height when the moral storm centre, which culminated in the cataclysm of the Eevolution, developed over France, and communi- cated a fresh impulse to the activity of the peace parties in the towns. These, as the seats of learning and journa- hstic enterprise, became in turn fresh centres of infection, and presently a wave of sickly humanitarianism over- spread the whole of Prussian society, penetrating even into the Aimy itself, which had already been rendered susceptible to the poison by its bloodless campaign in Bohemia. The situation was best summed up in Riichel's speech commemorating Prince Henry of Prussia's career in the Army, in which he extolled him in the following words : " Gliicklicher als Caesar bei Dyrachium, als Conde bei Rocroi, gewana er ohne Schlacht den Sieg." And if a General with Riichel's fighting record could enunciate sentiments like these, it can be imagined to what depths the Peace at any Price party could descend.

Briefly, these views would have done credit to our present day Hague Conference fanatics. War was a barbaric method oiTsettHng ~3Isputes' between rival governments, with which the honest citizen could have no concern, and if it should arise, then private property was to be duly respected and arrangements made to

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 11

carry it out with the least interference with business

matters possible.

Causes of These views were coromon to the whole

Defeats of of Europe at the outbreak of the French

the Allies Revolutionary Wars, and fundamentally

conditioned the whole series of defeats suffered by

the Allies during the years 1792-3 and 4, for _none

of the Nations felt the necessity for great sacrifices or

reaUzed the dangers with which they were about to be

confronted. " '~^"

The sequence of cause and effect was, moreover, so obvious to the several Armies engaged, that none of them saw in their defeats a sufficient reason for the sacrifices entailed by the wide-sweeping military reforms which (as subsequent events were to demonstrate) would have been absolutely necessary to ensure their survival. Indeed, from a military standpoint the soldiers were absolutely right, for locally the superiority of the line tactics copied from the Frederickian model had been abundantly justified. Defeat arose essentially from commissariat and transport difficulties, from which the Jb^rench, by reason of their poverty, had been com- pelled to emancipate themselves. All' the War Offices were bombarded by advice and proposals for reform, identical in spirit, often even in words, to those with which we in England became so familiar after the Boer War. But out of all these German reformers, only one, Scharnhorst, then in the Hanoverian Army, saw the true cause of all their troubles, namely that the French Kevolution had called a new factor into being, the spirit of the " Nation in Arms." ^

^ Die Ursachen unsere Niederlagen in den Niederlanden, 1794.

12 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

In the absence of this spirit in Prussia lay the root cause of all her subsequent misfortunes. The idea that the Prussian Army had fallen asleep on its laurels is entirely untenable. On the contrary, in no Armv in the Sfi^d iai-WffEe men devoted themselves to the study_ of^tte Jugher j^rgajches. of their professicm., or was the daily routine work of maintaining the efficiency of the troops carried out with greater fideUty and precision.

Nor was this labour entirely devoted to " spit and pohsh," as it is the custom to believe. On the contrary, the diaries of regimental officers and other contemporary documents recently pubUshed by the German General Staff 1 record a succession of experimental field days. days on the ranges, mornings spent in packing waggons, testing camp gear, etc., that remind one most forcibly of months spent on the Indian Frontier, where at least no one has accused the British officer of " slacking." But the resemblance goes deeper here than is' at first obvious, because, in neither case was the spirit of the people prepared to make the necessary financial sacrifices ; in both, nine-tenths of the energy was wasted for want of proper material to work upon.

The very foundation of an officer's training for higher commands lies in his power of bending hvunan nature to his will, and the development of that will by constant clash and friction with the wills of others. A man learns more in licking a raw company of recruits into shape in six weeks, than in doing duty with a made battalion in as many years.

Compulsory service in Prussia could alone have given

* UrkuncUiche Forachungen zur Oeachichte des Prussischen 'Heeres, Berlin. 1902-4.

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 13

the officers material to work upon. But though the matter was discussed from every point of view and Knesebeck's memorandum ^ foreshadowed almost exactly the steps ultimately taken, and for which the credit is unanimously assigned to Scharnhorst, (although he died of wounds received at Bautzen the year before they were actually embodied in the law), the truth was, that the People were not ready for any sacrifice in- volving either their personal freedom, or their pockets. Further than this, though parliamentary control in Prussia was non-existent, public opinion nevertheless hadVays of making itself felt, which no crowned head could afford to neglect. Hence, since no increase in the estimates could be entertained on any aocoimt, absolutely pressing reforms costing money could only be carried through by robbing Peter to pay Paul. There were, however, a great many Peters^ and a great many Pauls, each of whom had vested interests which cotild not be hampered without creating friction which it required lubrication to overcome. That lubrication was always found by an extension of the system of furloughs and of " watch free " men, and this struck at the very basis of efficiency.

Frederick That Frederick the Great was well aware of

the Great's this evil is apparent from the speech he made

Speec . g^^ Qjjg q£ jj|g jg^g^ Cavalry inspections held at

Potsdam."

" Gentlemen, I am entirely dissatisfied with the

Cavalry. The Eegiments are completely out of hand ;

there is no accuracy in their movements, no solidity,

no order. The men ride like tailors. I beg that this

"• See von der Goltz'a Boazbaeh und Jena.

14 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

may not occur again, ancj that each of you will pay more attention to his duty, more particularly to the horse- manship.

" But I know how things go on. The Captains think only ,of making money out of their Squadrons, and the Lieutenants, how to get the most leave. You think I am not up to your dodges, but I know them all and wiU recapitulate them. To-morrow, when you start on your march back to your garrison, before you are ten miles on your way, the Squadron Com- mander will ask the Sergeant-Major whether any of the men live in the vicinity, and the Sergeant-Major

will reply, ' Yes, sir ; there are and — — live quite

close to here, and will be glad to go on furlough.' ' Very well then,' the Captain will say, ' we can save their pay.i Send the names m to me to-night, and they shall have leave.' And so it goes on every march. The Lieutenants get leave to visit their friends, and the Captain arrives at his garrison with half the Squadron leading the horses of the other half, like a band of disreputable Cossacks.

" Then when the season for riding drills comes on, the Captain sends for the Sergeant-Major, and says :

•'I have an appointment this morning at and must

get away early; teU the first Lieutenant to take the rides.' So the Sergeant-Major goes to the first Lieu- tenant and gives him the message, and the latter says ; ' What ! the Captain is away. Then I am off hunting. TeU the second Lieutenant to take the men.' And the second Lieutenant, who is probably still in bed, says :

> The money went into the "contingent allowance" thence indirectly to the Captain's pocket.

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 13

What ! both of them gone ! Then I shall stay where I am ; I was up till 3 this morning at a dance ; tell the Cornet I am ill, and he must take the rides.' And the Cornet says : ' Look here, Sergeant-Major, what's the good of my standing out there in the cold ? You know all about it much better than I do ; you go and take the rides.' And so it goes on. And what must be the end of it all?

" Now march your Regiments home, and don't let me have to speak like this again." ^ Comoosition -^^^ neither he nor his successors were of Army at able to Suggest a remedy, and the result J®"^ was that at the time of the Jena cam- paign the evil had reached such dimensions that nearly two-thirds of the whole strength of the Army — that is to say, almost the whole of the "Landes- kinder " contingent served only for one month in the year, and when it is remembered how infinitely more complicated the whole drill and training of the soldier was in those days as compared to our own time, one can only marvel at the devotion of the permanent stafi who succeeded in this short period in getting such precision in movement and discipline in the field (out of such almost hopeless material) as the battlefields of Jena and Auerstadt undoubtedly proved them to possess. Unfortunately this work fell essentially on the non-commissioned officers, and not on the officers, as it should have done.

Nevertheless, the troops were, according to the standard of the period, well found in every respect,

1 Aua meinem Tagebuch, von Manoitz. See also Cavalry Past and Future by the Author.

i6 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

(except in great coats,) ^ and many important reforms, such as the introduction of hght infantry battal- ions, of improved muskets, of rifles for the_ picked- shots of each company, the provision of a small reserve oFtraineTm^rtomeet the first losses of a campaign ; and, last but not least, the formation of independent, DiArisions of all arms on the French model were actually carried into effect.

This last deserves a paragraph by itself, °DivisToii' for though unquestionably right in principle, Organjza- a defect in its execution proved practically **"" the determining causes of the final dis- aster at Jena. This defect lay in spUtting up the whole of the Cavalry and Artillery and distributing them approximately equally to the Infantry commands. The consequence was that both arms lost the habit of working in " masses," and " masses " under the hand of the Army Commander were absolutely essential to coimter the tactics of the French Army. Fifty squadrons under a Seydlitz at Auerstadt, or a hundred guns under a Senarmont at Jena, might have changed the fate of Europe ; but no such men were forthcoming, and one of the most gallant Armies of which history has any

* The want of great coats arose in the following manner. In the chronic wars &t the beginning of the 18th century the men wore a long-waisted, sleeved waistcoat; over this a sub- stantial frockcoat, which came down to the knee and was folded back when marching. This cut into a great deal of cloth, and when peace came, the Colonels having the clothing contract found they could economize money by skimping their men's coats, so that by degrees the frockcoat shrank to a ridiculous coatee about as warm as the old waistcoat, which disappeared altogether. Then it was discovered that the men's health suffered through such in- sufficient clothing, and " watchooats " for sentry-go were intro- duced, and it was intended to introduce these for the whole Army when the War broke out.

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 17

record was destroyed' in driblets, because it lacked a firm skeleton of force to hold tbe fractions together. On the afternoon of October 14, 1806, Jena ** ^P°^ ^^® plains of Jena the Army of Frederick the Great ceased to exist, and only scattered fragments drifted away north and west, without \ plan, or any design for re-union.^ They had been beaten, (y ' not through any fundamental defect in their tactical training. It is necessary to insist on that, but, in so far as any purely military reason can be assigned for their fate, it was because their Grenerals, grown old in the tradi- tions of the Seven Years' War had never realized that the mobUity of an Army is not so much a question of how fast men can swing their legs along a road, but of how long it takes their leaders to decide aloiig which roads they shall march. Never before or since has the fate of a Nation depended so whoUy on what men generally call chance, but which some of us prefer to attribute to the direct iaterposition of the Almighty, to whom, after all, pubHc opinion still attributes the position of Arbitrator of the Battlefield.

When morning broke on that fateful day, a dense fog, seemingly not anticipated by any one on the field,

I II III II iriiiiiii ■ii.i^... iii,r^iMli.iewiiii'"-iTiTrr»w»-1 IT- , ,1 if

(though after aU a very frequeiit phenomenon on an October morning) himg low over the whole plateau,

^ This collapse, however, was an absolutely necessary outcome of the false conception of War which had sprung up from the false humanitarianism of the age. War was a cxu-se and an anachronism having no place in its enlightened philosophy. The soldier was a useless drone, living on the hard-earned savings of the honest citizen, and the outcome of these opinions was the tyranny of iVance in Glermany, after the disastrous battle of Jena. — See Voluntary and Compulaory Service, also War and the World's Life, by the Author.

i8 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

on which the Prussians stood, and it was thanks to that accident alone that the French Emperor, Lannes andthe Imperial Guard escaped"annihilation. It is utterly incon- ceivable tEt^adTthfi Prussians been able to see their : target of 50,000 men crowded in a dense mass, each i one pressing breast against the knapsack of the man ' in front of him, on the narrow summit of the Landgrafen- I berg, they could have failed to seize their oppor- I tunity. Had they done so, with the Guard, Lannes, i and the Emperor routed, neither Ney, Augereau, or Bemadotte were the men to have saved the situation. After Jena there followed a series of consequences, the absolutely inevitable results which must every- where ensue when a Nation, having lost touch with the realities of life, forgets that War is a necessary incident in its evolution which cannot be evaded by refusing to recognize its existence. The Prussian people, believing the question at issue to be solely the affair of Govern- ments and their instruments (the Armies), welcomed the conquerors as deliverers, and turned their own soldiers, even the wounded, away from their doors with an excess of brutahty which disgusted even the French troops, whose previous experience had rendered them anjrthing but squeamish on the score of humanity. The Prussian Generals, trained for a whole generation to a blind veneration for civil law and the sacred rights of private property, did not dare to accept the respon- sibility of requisitioning the food and shelter of which their men stood so urgently in need. They left the ample resources which the country afforded to fall into the hands of the French, who were restrained by no such pusillanimous scruples. But it was not hunger

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 19

alone tliat led to the wholesale stirrenders characteristic of this phase of the War. The retreat was in fact the very converse of that of the French five years later from Russia, when hunger brought about the complete disruption of the bonds of discipline, and those fractions of the Army which still held together owed their salva- tion solely to the unconquerable spirit of their Chiefs. Here the German troops stuck to theic ranks imtil they fell from sheer exhaustion. It was the Leaders who betrayed the honour of their men, not through inten- tional treachery or cowardice (their subsequent records, as we shall see hereafter, abundantly clear them of that dishonour), but because they too had become inoculated with that false humanUarianism which places the indivi- dual above the race — and in its shortsightness is ready to purchase immediate rehef at the cost of enhanced sufEering for the many hereafter.

A perfect epidemic of surrender set in amongst the higher Commanders — ^not only did detachments in the open field lay down their arms by order, but Comman- dants of fortresses, such as Magdeburg, Ciistrin, Torgau and Spandau opened their gates unconditionally, " to avert the further sufEering of the civil population."

As von der Goltz has explained in his " Von Jena his Preussische Eylau" current military opinion, founded mainly on the events of the latter years of Frederick's life, had led Prussian Generals to look on War more as an intellectual exercise than as the direction and control of elemental forces.

You played the game according to the rules, and when the rules indicated that you had lost, you sub- mitted with a good grace and cheered the winner, like

20 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

the crew of a beaten yacM after a race. Only Bliiclier and Schamliorst, who being thrown together during the retreat, learnt to know and appreciate each other's characters, seem to have stood out resolutely against the general trend of sentiment, and their chance associa- tion was destined to bear remarkable fruit in years to come.

Meanwhile most of Pomerania and all East Prussia escaped for the moment the ravages of the invaders, and when on November 5, the last remnants of the Field Army passed into captivity, there stUl remained avail- able, according to von der Goltz, trained men enough to place some 40 battalions and 55 squadrons in the field. But instead of caUing these out to the last man and horse, the talk at the Rqyal Headquarters was only of peace, and peace there probably would have been but for the Emperor Alexander, who, imtroubled by the fate of his AUy, determined to continue his war with Napoleon, and Napoleon's own excessive demands, which simply drove King Frederick William IV into the arms of the Eussians.

Ultimately, when all hope of pacifying the Emperor by further surrender was at an end, a small field force of some 12,000 men was mobilized and sent to join the Eussians. These, by their timely arrival on the field of Preussische Eylau, succeeded in averting the complete defeat of the Eussian Army, and by the relative ease with which they had driven the exhausted remnants of the Divisions under St. Hilaire and Priant before them, they brought the first gleam of hope to the soldiers of the old Prussian Army. It convinced them that when the time came, under competent leaders, these men

■ THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 21

could still give an excellent account of themselves even against the victors of Jena.

Reorgani- '^^® treaty of Tilsit on July 9, 25 days zation after the battle of Friedland, brought the

a er Jena. ^^^ ^ ^^ ^^^ After that not a moment

was lost in setting to work at the reform and re- generation of the Prussian Army.

A Eoyal Commission imder the presidency of Scharn- horst, with Gneisenau, Boyen and Grohnan as members, was assembled on the 25th of the same month at Memel. In January, 1808, it moved to Konigsberg, and early in that year produced a report which may be con- sidered as the starting point of the modem German Army, notwithstanding the fact that at the moment Schamhorst's proposals for universal service were not deemed practicable by the King, and did not in fact become law until September, 1814, nearly a year after that great soldier's death.

By this scheme the Prussian Army was in future to consist of three Corps, based on Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia respectively, with a total field strength of 84 battalions, 96 squadrons and 24 batteries of Artillery.

The distinction between " Auslander " and " Landes- kinder" was done away with. In principle, though voluntary recruiting was maintained, the law compelling " Cantons," or districts, to furnish their allotted contin- gent of recruits was revised and strengthened. But far too large a number of local privileges with regard to exemp- tion were retained. The whole system of furlough men, and of " Friewaohter " ^ was swept away, and it was

* Men exempted from duty and allowed to practise their trades in the town.

22 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

decreed that in future no Prussian soldier might be subjected to corporal, or other, degrading punishment.

At the same time a Court was appointed to inquire into all cases of surrender of fortresses, or in the open field, before which officers of all ranks were cited to appear. Fortunately procedure and communications were both so slow and uncertain, that only some cases had been dealt with, and none of the death sentences, eight in all,^ had been carried out, when the general amnesty announced in the King's proclamation to his people accompanying the declaration of War against France on March 16th, 1813, suspended all proceedings.

The actual cadres available for the new Army in December, 1807, amounted to 50 Line Battalions, 11 Companies of Light Infantry, 9 Companies of Kifles and 86 Squadrons (no Batteries are mentioned by HoUe- ben, which indicates the Httle importance attached to Artillery at the period) but this amoimt, limited though it was in comparison with Prussia's former power, appeared altogether excessive to Napoleon, who on January 1, 1809, pubUshed his celebrated decrees limit- ing the whole Prussian Field Army to 42,000 men, to be apportioned amongst the three arms as follows : —

10 Infantry Regiments 22,000

8 Cavalry Regiments (of 4 Squadrons) . . 8,000

Artillery, and Sappers 6,000

Guard, Infantry and Cavalry .... 6,000

42,000 No increase was allowed for the next ten years. This blow came like a thunderbolt upon the reformers, abeady well advanced in their great undertaking.

' See Lehmann's Life of Scharnhorat.

THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 23

The idea of Army Corps, even of Divisions, had to be abandoned, and six Brigades substituted as the principal unit consisting each of 7 to 8 battaUons, 12 Squadrons and a Brigade of Artillery, comprising 12 Companies of foot and three of horse artillery — each being armed with 6 guns, 12 or 6-pounders and 2 howitzers.

Schamhorst also endeavoured to create a " National Guard " on the model of the French organisation, but this was vetoed by Napoleon, though he did allow the inhabitants of Berlin and some of the other large towns to organize themselves for the maintenance of order.

All the ingenuity of the Reformers was now devoted to the circumvention of the Napoleonic decree, and many were the expedients resorted to. Amongst others a most promising idea was started for the " reUef of the unemployed" by finding them work on the repair of the coast fortresses, always liable to attack froni the British Fleet. As most of the unemployed were old soldiers, and as the only decent clothing available for them happened to be the stores of old uniforms ; in a surpris- ingly short time it became indispensable to issue these uniforms, as after even a few days' work, the rags the poor fellows brought with them became a scandal to pubhc morahty. Thus some 6 to 7,000 good and true men were kept together who only needed muskets to become most formidable soldiers. But this adroit measure did not escape the eye of the French Emperor, and presently this system was vetoed also.

The chief means of escape from French restrictions was found in the extension of a time-honoured custom of the old Army, by which every miUtary unit had been allowed to entertain a few supernumerary recruits

24 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

known as " Kriimpers " as a part trained reserve against mobilization.

This system was now extended, and eacli Company, Squadron or Battery was authorized to call up three to four men for one month's training, dismissing them at the end of that time and replacing them by others. But even this seemed superfluous to Napoleon, and the number was finally fixed at eight per Company, and three per Squadron for four months' training.

Fortunately during 1810-11, smuggling in the Baltic reached such a pitch that Napoleon felt it expedient to relax the stringency of his restrictions, and a few more men found employment as coastguards.

In August, 1811, the Prussians had actually 74,000 trained men available, of whom 48,000 belonged to the Field Army.i But Napoleon had now determined to force the Prussians to declare war against Russia, and to furnish him with a contingent therefor. Accord- ingly on September 13, he instructed St. Marsan, his Ambassador to Berlin, to demand the suspension of their preparations and their agreement to join him in his contemplated enterprise, giving the TCmg only three days in which to decide. At the same time he warned Davout at Hamburg to be ready to move into Prussia at a moment's notice, adding this characteristic instruc- tion as to his behaviour, which advocates of Hague Conferences would do well to remember. " Si vous entrez en Prusse, il ne faut faire aucune proclamation, ni rien dire, mais tout prendre, et desarmer " {Cones. 18,139). This threat compelled the King to temporize. All ' P. 13. HoUd>en, VoL I.

THE PRUSSIAN A^Y IN 1813 25

preparations in excess of Napoleon's limitations were stopped, and Bliicher, Scharnliorst a,nd others to whom the Emperor had taken exception were dismissed. Finally he yielded, and on February 24, 1812, an alliance with France was concluded, by which Prussia agreed to furnish a contingent of 19 Battahons, 24 Squadrons and 60 guns under the command of von Grawert, who was subsequently relieved by von Yorck on August 13 of the same year.

There remained then in Prussia, as a nucleus for further formations, 26 BattaUons, 54 Squadrons and 108 guns, or 22,394 men, field troops, 9,785 for garrisons, and in the 6,052 depots. The field troops were thoroughly efficient, and, thanks to the particular circumstances under which they had fought at Eylau, had recovered confidence in themselves, which was not weakened by their experiences in Russia ; and behind the garri- sons and dep6ts there existed a large number of veterans of 1806-7 who had managed to make their way back to their homes, but could not be enrolled owing to the terms of Napoleon's decree, already referred to above.

THE FEENCH AEMY IN 1813

CHAPTER II

The French Army in 1813

Up to the outbreak of the French Revolution the French Army had been recruited on a voluntary basis. The power to call out a certain quota of men from each district, to make good any deficiency in the supply of volunteers, existed as in Prussia, but had seldom been enforced, and even after the outbreak of the Revolution the greatest reluctance to enlist men into the Regular Army, except with their own goodwill, was shown. Since numbers, however, had to be found far in excess of the regular Army establishments, all sorts of expedients were attempted. Volunteer regi- ments were formed and the hvee en masse, was decreed. Actually, however, law was so completely in abeyance during the first years of this period, that practically all the men who faced the enemy at the front may be considered essentially as volunteers. Whether raised originally by conscription, or joining of their own free will, the men generally began their service by deserting, and when on return to their homes they found their places filled up by others, and starvation or denunciation staring them in the face, they rejoined the colours as on the whole the safest place, and settled down to their soldiering with a fairly good grace. This requires to be understood, as it explains the excellent

30 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

spirit shown under the greatest hardships and privation by the Armies of the Ehine and of Italy, and accounts in a great measure for the soldierly tone of the troops throughout the following years of Napoleon's conquest, until the horrors of the retreat from Moscow in 1812 temporarily destroyed all organization.

Tourdan's ■'■* ^^® not _ until 1798 that a regular law of Con- system of conscription became law in France,

scription ^^^ though it was not so rigid as that subsequently adopted by Prussia in 1814 (being more generous in exemptions, and retaining the dangerous system of paid substitutes), yet, incomplete as it was, it formed the whole foundation for Napoleon's subsequent career, for no other ruler in Europe could afford " to expend 30,000 men a month," as he brutally expressed it.

Actually, in order not to make his rule unnecessarily unpopular, Napoleon did not in his early years exercise to its full extent the power which the law conferred upon him. His Allies at that time had to find the bxilk of his Army, the French Regiments merely replacing casualties and wastage as they arose ; but the men not taken were nevertheless liable for service till their twenty-sixth year, and were thus available to meet any crisis which might arise. Assured of this reserve supply of raw material, the Emperor was free to conceive and practise methods of strategy and tactics to which his adversaries, Austria, England and Prussia, could oppose no reply — because they dared not contemplate (without a certain supply of men to fall back upon) the terrible destruction of troops which his rapid marches and battles entailed. This is the central feature of the whole period of Napoleonic warfa/re, and must he

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 . 31

kept steadily in mind, if true condusions from its-phenom£na are to be drawn.

Composition ^'^* ^^ *^® whole Grand Army of some of Grand 600,000 men, who in 1812 crossed the Army, 1812^^^33^^^^ Frontier, only 200,000, in round numbers, were of French extraction.^ The popula- tion of France being approximately 36 miUions, the annual contingent should have been, in round figures, 360,000 of which at least 180,000 would have been physically fit for service. Hence, making the usual allowance for wastage, and deducting a whole milhon for men killed and permanently disabled during his-campaigns, there should have been in France not less than two arid a half miUion men stilljof_an_ ajge to Jbear arms when Napoleon returned to Paris in January, 1813. The extent to which he fell short of raising these numbers is evidence of the growing unpopularity of j his pitiless rule, and of the extraordinary laxity of internal administration.

There was, therefore, no real deficiency of men for a new Army, after the, calamitieJ_....ol, the. Resign Betreat,,,_.bjflL.there JKSa, a great ^want^^of^ ofl&cers and non-commissioned officers to form cadres around which to group the men.

Fortunately, and possibly in view of horts" " *'i6 8'Ctual eventuality. Napoleon had organ- ized a special body of National Guards, strictly for home defence, during the previous year. To mark distinctly the difference between their status and that of troops of the Eegular Army, they

' See Max Jahn's Franzoiische Heer, also Bousset and the Duke d'Aumale.

32 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

had been formed in "cohorts," not in "battahons." As a matter of fact, though there was a distinction there was no difference, for these " cohorts," having been recruited from amongst the better class whose position had secured them the favour of the prefets of their districts, and being ofi&cered by men who had seen service, had acquired a very fair standard of drill and discipliae. Consequently the " cohorts " were at once invited to volunteer as units for the emergency, and .since the great majority of their men would have been liable, in case of refusal, to go as conscripts of the previous years, of two evils they accepted the least, and were amongst the first to march for the front, where they did excellent service.

Napoleon's next step was to caU out 100,000 men of the contingents of 1808-9-10, who had escaped previous drafts, and then in quick succession the whole contingents for 1813 and 1814, which should have given at least 360,000 men. As a fact they did not realize more than 200,000, so great was the incessant wastage from desertion.^

To weld this raw material into shape, officers and non- commissioned officers were withdrawn wholesale^from tite troops in Spain, and as the survivors of the Grand ^nny^drifted back into Germany, all not absolutely required at the front were sent back by post to Mayence, and the Ehine to take up their places in the new units.

Training ^^ ^*^* ^^ *^® ^^^ recruits arrived

of the new at the Depots, they were formed into

'^'^^' provisional Companies, about 100 strong,

* For details of desertion and measures to stop it, see " Les Refrao- taires" in supplement to MU. Wochblt., 1887.

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 33

and marched off to the frontiers by ten to fifteen mile stages, picking up arms and imiform, at the arsenals they passed through, and drilling a couple of hours every afternoon. At the frontier these Com- panies were grouped into provisional Battahons, and again despatched on their way, driUing as they went. As the average number of stages was from forty-five to sixty, with one rest day in five, by the time they reached the front, they had been some sixty to eighty days under arms, were in thorough marching condition, and on the whole were rather better fitted for their work than would be a fair British Militia Battalion at the end of its annual training. The Artillery also reached the front in good condition, the supply of guns and material was ample, though sometimes antiquated in pattern, tlie simply of draught horses suflBtcient and of fair quality, and the traditions of the Service quite admirable. The Cavalry and Staff formed the weakest links in the chain. The former had suffered most of all during the Retreat from Moscow, and the supply of riding horses in France, never of a high stamp, had been so exhausted by previous efforts, that thousands of men had to be marched into Germany on foot, and saw their horses for the fijst time almost in jgresenceof the enemy. British Officers with South African experience can easily picture the consequences of such conditions. Fortunately the demands made on the Staff were not of a high order. With Corps and Divisional Commanders so thoroughly war-trained, little more than courage and goodwill on the part of their assistants was required, and in these qualities the French were never lacking.

D

34 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN-

A few words are now needed to explain Evolution tlie evolution of the tactical forms wMcli these troops were about to employ. The old Royal Army of France had been trained essentially on Prussian lines, indeed the drill book for the Infantry of 1791 was an adaptation of an edition of the Prussian regulations originally drafted by Guibert, who died before its publication,^ but though the form was the same, the French had never succeeded in assimilat- ing the spirit. French national characteristics were all ^against the extreme rigidity and slowness which characterized the Prussian model, and for years before the Revolution there had existed a school dia- metrically opposed to the regulation methods. The whole nation took sides in the discussions which fol- lowed, the popular side being aU against the official attitude, and it happened that the former received very strong corroboration of their principles from the experiences brought back from Canada and the United States by the men who had fought against us in both countries. Moreover, when the great era of revolutionary warfare commenced in 1792, there was obviously no time to train the raw levies called forth by the Revolu- tion to anything approaching the standard of dexterity in loading and manoeuvring which the old time tactics required. A compromise between the two was the only possible solution, and in face of the enemy the French Infantry evolved a working system of its own, based primarily on adaptation of forms to circumstances. In other words, they fought in line when they could,

* See Max Jahns, KriegsgeacMchUichen Wiasensehaften, VoL IV. p. 2,594. Compare also Colin's Le DiaUpline et la Taetique dans lea Armies de la Bivolution,

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 35

as skirmisliers and in columns when they had to, and by the time Napoleon assumed control over them they had become a supple and finished instrument ready to his hand, and needing only the directions of his genius and the driving power of his will to ensure great results. Growth of -^ further change of far-reaching im- the Army portance had also evolved itself from the ^'P* conditions of their growth. It being im- possible, in the time available, to create the discipline needed for the rigid order of battle of the Frederi- ckian period, more importance had to be conceded to the personal element of command. The more highly discipHned the troops, the less it appears necessary to consult their likes and dislikes ; but raw troops can only be reHed on to follow the man whom they trust, and it takes time, more or less according to the personality of the leader, to win this confidence. Hence, generally, j/- ihe longer men can he held together under the same ftji Commander, the better is the guarantee for their efficiency.TS:: This led, naturally, to the growth, first of the Division, ^ then of the Corps, as an organic whole, the imits of which were kept permanently together till men and officers understood and reUed on each other imphcitly. yi

This rendered decentralization of command practicable. Army Headquarters no longer required to issue detailed instructions to every unit in the whole command, but could confine themselves to informing the Commander of the Division or Corps as to the general intention of a manoeuvre, and the part which his unit was expected to play in it, leaving it to him to make his own arrange- ments for carrying out his special task. EssentiaUy, U was the enormous economy in time, rendered possible

36 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

by this decentralization, which gave the French Armies their great swperiority in mobility over all others, on in turn the earlier strategy of Napoleon was

The growth of the Divisional system led in time to the closer association of the several arms of the service. Infantry, Cavalry and particularly Artillery, learnt to play together, and no longer lost sight of the whole in the pursuit of their own glorification. Thus the Artillery developed in tactical mobility and its officers trained themselves for the part they were destined to play. On the other hand, the Cavalry, no longer being called on to act in masses, lost sight of those essential factors in their training which alone renders possible their action in " mass." In consequence of this they never again found opportunity to make good their short- comings in this respect. It was want of horsemanship primarily, not of horsemastership which lay at the root of their many failures.

Unlike Frederick the Great, who devised a system of tactics and then forged the tools to suit it, Napoleon paid httle attention to the making of his instruments, his crowded Ufe left him ^too little opportunity, but he took the toots ready to his hand and made the tiesi possible tise of them as he found them.

Napoleon's ^° *^' however, he remains the " Master " Military for all time. But he did not burst full

Education flg^gg^ j^^ ^j^e guttle world, he grew to his fuU stature by a process, brief indeed as measured against other great Generals' lives, but presenting, nevertheless, well marked stages which it is impera- tive to keep in mind.

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 37

What was chiefly noticeable, about, him , in. hjsjj^gii^ was not conspicuous mental capacity, but an astonighing power of— conunan^. which he iexercised apparency unconsciously, the astounding feature being that even in Corsica, his own country, where prophets are usually held in least respect, men, years his superior in experience, rendered him spontaneous and willing obedience, though under no obligation whatever to do so.

Though Brienne is always spoken of as a miUtary college, in fact there existed at that place no special mihtary curriculum at all — his reading there, and previous to his prolonged leave to Corsica, had been of the most general nature, nor can it be truthfully said that such notes of his as have been handed down to us show any very marked symptoms of unusual genius. It was not until he joined the battaUon of the Royal Artillery whose Headquarters were at Valence in 1791 that he appears to have taken up any miUtary study in earnest. Here he came-oader thfiinfluence of a first-. rate_AjiJIlfiHSti.BM.on^ Officer,

who quickly appreciated his abihty, and took him into his confidence. Du Teil was a weU-known military authority in his day, and at his house it is probable that Bonaparte met d'Urtubi and Gassendi, all equally eminent in their way. He certainly read the works of Guibert and Peuquieres, and he could hardly help studying Lloyd's History of the Seven Yeari War. Mar- shal Saxe's Reveries were also not without influence on him, and he had access to the two works on Mountain Warfare of Bosroger and Bouroet, which were con- sidered so important in those days that they were

38 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

never printed, but circulated from hand to hand in manuscript copies.^ The leading characteristic of aU these works can be briefly summarized. All were permeated by the sfirit of aUack, aU saw clearly that the decision of the battlefield was everything, and that ArtUlery was essentially the arm by whose concentrated action the way could be swept clear for the attacking columns, whether of horse or foot, or both, to penetrate or roll up the enemy's line of resistance.

If the practice of the eighteenth century lagged far behind these principles, this was due to causes inherent in the nature of things, which could only be modified by revolutionary upheaval, and it was Napoleon's good fortune that he arrived on the scene at the very moment when all the barriers of the past had been swept away, and he was able to employ the means at his disposal without hindrance from the causes which had tied the hands of iis predecessors.

^jjg His first campaign of 1796 reveals abso-

Italian lutely nothing beyond what any one of his

Campaigns ^ap^gpg j^ yfgj. could themselves have

planned, though all probably would have Jacked the astounding _jeQersy„ jind potyer. of commanawhiciT was peculiaj ^ to^Eim^,jjiBa.e. In the battles east of Milan,' hisplans were based on the complete pre- eminence of the tools at his disposal, (both in marching and fighting,) over their adversaries — a de Wet might have done as much — and in the Marengo Campaign we find him so over-confident in the fighting qualities of his soldiers, that he threw to the winds all the usual maxims of concentration on the decisive point, all care

' See Colin's Education MUitaire de Na/polion, p. 135, et seq.

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 39

for his commumcations, and was caught at hopeless disadvantage by the Austrians, only escaping disaster by a miracle.

It would seem that it was the Ulm 1 Camo^*" Campaign^ which first opened his eyes to the possibilities whinh mifyht a.rise if his enemy insisted on doirvg the wronci thing, or some- . thing which from the Emyeror's point of view was so ' vMerly preposterous that he had completely failed to provide for such action in his genercd scheme.

He crushed Mack, not by strategic prevision, but 1 simply because he was in full and undisputed command of some 200,000 first-rate fighting men, able to march at least twice as far in twenty-four hours as the 80,000 1 Austrians opposed to them. But f or_ajeries of occur- rences within the Austrian Army which Napoleon neither..

I ■ — -^ ■■II --- ■■! Ill"" " " ' -—-~—~'^'- •" — "'°'™^'"-"'»*»n'»i<fiii^,„,„„^.^_^^j^^j„,.iA«fliJ — ~.-i-tirm ■ Kiifli^Mi

could, nor in fact did, foresee. Mack would have escaped his grasp, with consequences for the French Anny « almost as bad as a defeat in the open field. The spec- tacle of six French Corps, some 150,000 men, converging on a geographical point devoid of defenders from which aU food had been removed or destroyed, would ^ have made the Emperor the laughing stock of Europe, and must have shaken his prestige with his own men to a degree which would have rendered it impossible for him to have called upon them to face again the hunger and privation of a similar march.

At Austerlitz, the enemy attacked him, hence the

central problem of strategy — ^viz., how to hold fast the

enemy and compel him to stand to be beaten — never arose,

and there is no indication in his correspondence, to the

' See Campaign de 1805, Alombert et Colin.

40 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

best of my knowledge, to show how he would have solved it.

j^g But by the opening of the Jena Campaign,^

Jena it is clear that Jie had thought the question

Campaign ^^^ -^ j^^ entirety, and realized to the full

that the ''\ind,evendent will 'power" of the adversary^

js after all the most dijficuU fg/tinr fn r.nnf.rol jn vm^

1 His first object was to beat the Prussians thoroughly

I and decisively, before the Russians could join them,

but how if the Prussians refused to stand to be beaten ?

■^ I .....I.!,- ■■II

/ He calculated, and as the event proved correctlyTthat a threat at their Capital would be certain to provoke them to attempt its defence. But he could not foresee

I from which direction his enemy might attempt to inter- fere with his march thither ; hence he resolved to march his troops in such a formation that he would be equally ready to fight him from whatever quarter the attack might come.

(This led him to his celebrated "battahon square of 200,000 men." It is the same reasoniag, in fact, that has led us to the formation of squares in the Soudan — ^but with this difEerence, which is very essential.

The French Army had to cover an area big "enough to afford subsistence for its men, because it had abandoned the magazine system of Frederick the Great's day, and had also to be adapted to the roads of the district they traversed. Therefore it was impossible to march ready for action Uterally at a moment's notice, and consequently Advance Guards or Flanking parties had to be sent out, of such strength and to such distances, that their resistance, ^ See Bonnal's La Manoeuvre de Jena.

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 41

even if attacked by overwhelming numbers, could gain time for the remainder of the troops to concentrate.

A weak advance, or flank, guard, or one of Cavaky \ only, might, of course, give warning of the enemy's approach, but it could not hold that enemy or hinder ( him in the execution of his designs ; but some sixty thousand men attacking with vigour could not be 1 neglected, and would force the enemy to turn and fight, thus riveting his attention and creating a fixed point about which the remainder of the assailants could manoeuvre.

This win be clearer if the accompanying diagram is consulted. Had Lannes and Augereau, for instance, been attacked from the direction of Magdala, by the whole Prussian Army (as might well have happened) they had room to manoeuvre, and^ven 180,000 Prussians could not have wiped out 60,000 of the best French troops under twenty-four hours' fighting ; but in twenty- lour hours The remainder of the French Army would have appeared on the field, and victory, generally, is to the Commander who can place the last closed forces on the field. The plan would work equally if the Prussians struck the Advance Guard under Davout and Bernadotte. The two combined were quite capable of holding their own until the Emperor with the Main body could arrive, and though in fact, the Prussians did neither, but separated their forces on the eve of the engagement, this only weakened their chances of victory as far as the strategic side of the question was concerned.

Actually, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the fate of the day turned on the tactical errors of the Prussians. But had Davout and Bernadotte remained

42 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

together, as Napoleon evidently anticipated and desired, the arrival of these sixty thousand men even very late in the day might have been coimted on to avert disaster, if not defeat. j It is, however, clear that the very readiness for imme- diate action which this formation impUed, renders it certain that Na£oleon djc^not^discount tiie consequences ofviotory_beforehand. Not a detachment was made toi^xeaten_ti^ enemy's communications inadvance, _ ^ t>Tit the troops were_ arranged to win the battle first, !/j no matter what ..position_relative^_to Jbhe^ enemy's^ possible lines qfretreat might resrilt_fcomjhe^fighting. The general conception of strategical manoeuvrmg common throughout all Europe until his time (and prevailing in some countries even to-day) aimed at reaping the results of victory before the victory itself was won. In fact they tried to " sell the skin before they had killed the bear." As we shall see later on. Napoleon himself sometimes fell into this error, but this was the outcome of his overweening confidence in the power of his troops to win, when fighting under his direct personal control.

From 1806 onward, this tendency to hold and fix the enemy so as to obtain a -pivot abotdwhich^to mance/ume became the characteristic of the Napoleonic system. Even though at times one seems to detect marked divergencies from it, as at Pultusk (1807) in particular, analysis only shows that like the rest of us, the greatest Generals have to bow to the old saying " on fait la soupe avec ce qu'on a, non avec ce qu'on vent " and roads and con- ditions of supply at times proved stronger than his desire.

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 43

Prom the clutch of this system no enemy could escape unless endued with superior mobility and greater staunchness combined, for only troops of the highest order could endure the strain of repeated retreats without dissolution. Moreover, it was necessary for these tactics of evasion that the theatre of operations should have ample depth, as iti Russia, and this depth was not always forthcoming. It is in the successive variations of these factors that the strategic interest of the Campaign of 1813 principally Ues.

Meanwhile tactical evolution had also been at work, to which it is now necessary briefly to refer.

The strength of the old Revolutionary Army had lain, as already pointed out, in its admirable Infantry and its Divisional system, and it was essentially with the " tumiag movements " these two factors facilitated, that Napoleon won his victories up to the time of Jena and Friedland. But after the horrors of the Campaign in Poland the spirit of the French Infantry began to deteriorate, whilst at the same time their opponents not only became more numerous, but the temperature of their fighting spirit steadUy rose. The whole problem of battle-leading now resolved itself into this " How to create conditions which would render it possible for the Infantry, such as it was, to advance at all," and Macdonald's Corps at Wagram * shows one attempt at a solution — ^though an unsatisfactory one.

1 The accompanying diagram (p. 46) shows the formation of Mac- donald's corps at Wagram. This formation haj9 always been criticized on the assumption that it was intended to break the enemy's line by sheer weight. My impression is that no such idea entered Mac- donald's head, he was far too experienced a man to have made such an error ; rather, it would appear to me, it,ya» deliberately .adopted on the assnmpti(^..:thaJltM Mp tjattery of^lOO guns whichErec^ea

44 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

Napoleon's Gienerally the battle developed ia accord- Battle ance with the spirit which underlay the Tactics strategy. The object of the opening attacks was to hold, not merely to see. To meet them the enemy was compelled to bring up his reserves, and then began a struggle of will-power between the opposing leaders, in which Napoleon invariably won, because of his innate gift of command. For the time being he ceased to he open to the play of human sympathy. His best regiments might die in ranks as they stood, his most trusted leaders, seeing themselves on the point of annihilation, might clamour for rein- forcements, but nothing touched him until the moment eamje when his instinct told him that the " hatUe was ripe " as he expressed it, and the psychic force (which really wins battles) was waning faster in his opponents' ranks than in his own. Then the last reserves were brought forward, every available battery dashed to the front, and at case shot ranges blew a hole in the enemy's battle line through which the Cavalry and Infantry could penetrate. This idea was a century old. It is to be found in Guibert, du Teil and other writers, and is based on the analogy of the breach in a fortress, hut not until the association of the ArtiUery with the Infantry in permanent Divisions had been carried into effect

it woul(i_so far shatter the enemYlS-firg power that it Vyould experi;_ ence but little resiflf ance m"IEe actuai.paaas^e of^ihySieinv'B pSi^ "tion. t)iit wouM. Aen, encounter jiKeturioua attacks~oFhi3 reserves,^^ 'Jttlront and on the flanks, to imeet" wliicli "it woulJn5e"e9senEraI to have the whole corps in hand ready to fight in any direction.

Be this as it may, as a fact it failed, for the men threw them- selves down and allowed themselves to be trampled on. There is a tradition in the French Army, cited by Armand du Pic, that only 3,000 reached the enemy's position and about 3,000 were killed ; therefore the remaining 24,000 obviously did not go on.

THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 45

was it possible to overcome the teohnical difficulties in its execution. It was not really until the battle of Friedland, in 1807, that the machinery at last over- came its own internal resistance.

Indirectly this use of ^Napoleon's AxtUlery solved the problem of utiUzuig his very inefficient Cavahy on the battlefield. In Frederick's day, it was normally impos- sible to decide beforehand at what point the services of the Cavalry would be needed, hence a high degree of manoeuvring capacity was necessary to ensure its arrival at the right time and place. Now it became possible to predict with certainty where it would be required a considerable time in advance, and to move it into position without excessive demands on pace or manoeu- vring powers. Once formed it could be let loose to ride down its opponents by sheer weight of numbers, Uke the Bhattor horse against du Boigne's brigades at the battle of Jeypore.^

The Cavalry of the Allies throughout 1813 was

generally of a far higher standard than that of the

French, but as its Leaders could not determine where it

was Ukelyjio be required, much greater demands on its

endurance and drill efficiency were necessarily made,

which it was not always in a position to satisfy. With

bhe assured sense of superiority resulting from his

possession of a strategic system and a tactical proficiency

^ C!harge of the Rhattor Hoise. Note : The description of this charge in Skinner's Memoire is unfortunately too long to quote Briefly, 10,000 Rhattor Horse, formed in ft ^i^ft '':Sb}^"V, attacked the regular Mahratta Infantry under du Boign6, who stood in squares to meet them. They reserved their fire till the horsemen were almost on them, but it hardly checked the momentum of the charge. The mass swept over the squares like a tidal wave, and of 8,000 Infantry only 200 are said to have escaped. See Caedky versus Injaittry, p. 167, by the Author.

46 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

superioi to anything Ms adversaries conld oppose to him, Napoleon now tended towards over-confidence, and sometimes discounted his victory in advance, with con- sequences which ultimately iecame fatal both to his Army and himself. This tendency must be kept in mind as a basis of all criticism of the coming Campaign.

Fornuitinn *!f Macdonald r Corps lalVSi^a]

Omnium mud Umty Cvnlry

THE PEOLOGUE OF THE WAE

CHAPTEE III

The Prologue of the War

It was on December 4, 1812, that Napoleon left the wreck of the Grand Army, which six months ago he had led across the Niemen, to its fate in the snows of Russia. Handing the command of its pitiful remnant over to Murat, he hurried back to Paris as fast as post horses could carry him. On the 14th he was in Dresden. Prom there he wrote to the King of Prussia, calling on him to raise another 30,000 men,^ an order with which the King was most willing to comply, as it afforded cover under which to continue preparations for the national emergency which all Germans felt must arise sooner or later. On December 19 Napoleon arrived in Paris and wrote to Murat a letter,^ in which he made it appear that the King of Prussia had himself offered these reinforcements. No evidence of any such offer has, however, been found, and the motive which led to this distortion of fact remains obscure, unless Napoleon craftily intended to put fresh heart into his beaten and famishing soldiers by leading them to beUeve that the Prussians still had a good enough opinion of their invincibihty to offer to back them up in spite of their retreat from Moscow.

1 Cmrea. 19,385. » Oorrea. 19,388.

49

E

50 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

On January 19, 1813, the Emperor wrote to Davout, then in Hamburg,^ ordering him to seize Swedish Pomerania forthwith, if there were boots enough in store there to make it worth his while. The order was promptly carried out, but the boots had to be dearly paid for, as this violation of Swedish territory was not the least of the causes which subsequently compelled Bernadotte to throw in his lot with the Allies.

Meanwhile, the debris of Napoleon's beaten army was reaching the Prussian frontier, and a report of the Q.M.G. of^onigsberg shows that on December 21 there . were 255 French generals^ 699-- coloiiels, 4,412 captains and subalterns^ and 26,59Q_men, exclusive of 6,000 sick in the hospital, quartered in that district alone.

As the stragglers arrived at the frontier they were ordered to report at the following places : —

I and VIII Corps at Thorn ; II and III at Marien- burg ; IV and IX at Marienwerder ; V at Warsaw ; VI at Plock ; Artillery and Engineers at Danzig ; Dismounted Line Cavalry at Konigsberg ; Guard Cavalry at Elbing.

The 30th Division (Heudelet) consisting of Bavarians, together with 8 Squadrons, had only recently reached Danzig, and were the only formed body of troops avail- able for the field.

The X Corps, (Macdonald), to which the Prussian contingent under Yorck was attached, was still in the neighbourhood of Eiga, and the VII Corps (Eeynier) was with Schwarzenberg close to the Austrian frontier. The Eussians had halted about Vilna, and on the Bug, only following up the French retreat with their Cossacks, who on December 21 crossed the Prussian > Correa. 16,447.

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 51

frontier near Gumbinen and Insterburg. On Decem-

Convention ^®^ ^^ *^^ convention of Tauroggen was

of Taurog- concluded, hj which von Yorck separated

^*" himself from Macdonald and surrendered

to the Russians. The exact truth of this surrender

will probably never be ascertained, for many verbal

messages passed between Yorck and the King in

Berhn, of which under the circiunstances no written

record exists. The situation was far too dehcate to

entrust such secrets to paper.

General von Wrangel, in his Memoirs, published in 1830, says that in August, 1812, he carried verbal in- structions to von Grawert, authorizing him, in case of a general retreat, to separate from the French and withdraw on Graudenz, but von Grawert had just re- signed his command on account of sickness, and the message was delivered to his successor, von Yorck, who, however, did not show himself at all inclined to act upon verbal instructions in a matter of such moment. But already at an early stage of the proceedings a kind of tacit agreement had been arrived at to limit the fighting at the outposts " as far as was compatible with the honour of the Prussian arms," which was also a portion of the verbal instructions conveyed by von Wrangel, then a Major and confidential Staff Officer. The Russians kept Yorck well informed as to the progress of the retreat, and from -time to time made efforts to induce him to desert the French cause, but to all these Yorck returned answer that he had been aU his hfe a soldier, knew. nothing of diplomacy, and must carry out his orders. At length, in December, the collapse of the French Army becoming more evident

52 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

every day, Yorck transmitted a fresh proposal of the Russians to Berlin for the Royal instructions, and a Major von Seydlitz was sent to him again with verbal instructions, the precise import of which cannot be discovered, for the testimony of the eye-witnesses of the several interviews which now took place differs on several essential points. All that seems certain is that von Seydlitz' s verbal message actually did authorize Torek to act " according to circumstances," and these presently became so pressing, with the prospect of becoming immediately worse, that on the night of December 29 Yorck agreed to a meeting for the next day, at which the final terms of surrender were agreed upon with the Russians.

The King received the news of this surrender with every symptom of the gravest disapproval, and played his part so well that all the Court were convinced that his anger was most real. But a letter of the late Emperor WiUiam I, dated May 15, 1869 1 gives a some- what different complexion to the matter. The news had been brought to the King at Potsdam, who with the old Emperor William, then a boy of about sixteen, and other members of his family, was walking in the grounds of San Souci. The King went away to speak with the messenger, Graf. Henckel von Donnersmarck, and "for about half an hour we waited in extreme anxiety.

"Then the King returned with an expression of satis- faction on his face which we had not seen for a long time, but which seemed quite out of harmony with the little speech he made to the assembled group, > HoUeben, p. 86.

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 53

amongst whom were our respective adjutants and governors. ' Graf. Henckel has brought me bad news. Yorck has capitulated with his corps to the Eussians ; the times of 1806 seem about to repeat them- selves.' "

The Nation, of course, received the news with the warmest satisfaction, and when, as its immediate con- sequence, the French were found to be resuming their retreat, this satisfaction broke out into enthusiasm, which proved seriously embarrassing to the King, to whose insight into the situation and strength of charac- ter history has never rendered the justice which they deserve.

Character ^^^ ^^"^ ^*^® ^^®^ ^^^-"^ placed in a of King of more difficult position. Because at the Prussia (jj-igig of Jena, being then a young and inexperienced man, he had not overridden the opinions of the war-seasoned Generals, by whom he was sur- rounded, he has been credited with a weakness of purpose and want of capacity very much in excess of his deserts.

No unprejudiced man can read, either his comments on the many reform projects submitted to him before the catastrophe, or the regulations for which he was personally responsible, without being struck by the clear, practical common-sense brought to bear upon every subject. This quality of his always grasped the whole of a matter where his relatively irresponsible advisers saw only their own part in it. After the War he had to conquer the confidence of his Army and his people over again. To do so, in the interests of the Nation, he played a part most repugnant to his strictly

54 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

honourable nature, whicli revolted at the duplicity required by the urgency of the situation.

From the very first it is abundantly clear that he meant to prepare Prussia for the reconquest of her political independence, but as events have abundantly proved, he knew the temper of his people and the amazing power of Napoleon far more thoroughly than did the reformers. He knew quite well that the French Emperor would never rest without an effort to retrieve his fame ; such an effort was indeed a prime necessity of his continued existence, and the King of Prussia not only gauged ^g,_yet^untouched^resources_^of the French Empice with rare accuracy, but he divined, and nghSyTas events were soon to prove, the want as yet of any real depth of national patriotism in his own people. The reforms of Stein and Hardenberg were the corner-stone of real military efficiency, and these needed nearly two generations of activity before the spirit of parochialism, the characteristic of the period, could be welded into a coherent and imperial whole. ^

All doubts as to the military importance of Torek's action are set at rest by Napoleon's own opinion. On January 19 he wrote to Jerome in the following words (Corres. 19,462) : " The immediate consequences of this act of treachery are that the King of Naples will have to withdraw behind the Vistula, and that my losses will be increased by all the sick left in the hospitals

1 The population of -Prussia being 4,800,000, there should have been not less than 420,000 men stiU of an age to bear arms, of which less than 100,000 were actually with the colours ; yet only 10,000 responded to the call for volunteers between January 1 and June 31. Evidently the spirit of the time was hardly ripe for Scham- horst's reforms.

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 55

of Old Pnissia." Ckusewitz, who was present with » Wittgenstein's"^ Headquarters, confirmed this by his '- independent testimony to the effect that the Eussian Army was so completely exhausted by its losses that I jiad Yorck agd_MacdgnaJd^_renigjne^^ the pur-

suit must have come to a standstill on the Niemen, ' and all the resources of East Prussia would iave been paralysed for months to come. As it was, East Prussia [ proved the nucleus of the Nation's revival, for the Cossacks pressing on the heels of the French gave the necessary screen behind which the first new forma- tions could be organized, without news of them reaching the French Emperor. The King The situation was indeed one that called leaves for all the King of Prussia's perspicacity. At Berlin he was still within the clutches of his adversary, and might at any moment be taken prisoner. To avoid this risk he left Berhn on Jan- uary 22, and betook himself to Breslau.

On his way he wrote to Napoleon, pointing out ia diplomatic language that though he was most anxious to fulfil his treaty obhgations, money was an indis- pensable condition of his compliance, and that if the French Government's payment for the supplies issued to French troops during the previous year was forth- coming (as provided for in their agreement) the process of rearmament would be greatly facilitated.^

Meanwhile, the Estates of East Prussia met on their

own initiative at Konigsberg, being cut ofE from direct

communication with their King, who officially, was still

the Ally of Napoleon, by the Eussian screen of Cossacks,

1 The amount claimed was 100 million francs.

55 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

and with great enthusiasm passed a resolution in favour of placing aU the resources of the district at the dis- posal of Yorck, Bulow and Borstell, the principal military representatives on the spot, and they proceeded to call out the quotas of men due under the existing law from the several parishes. But though the towns- people were ready to welcome all signs of military activity, the peasants in the country shewed no cor- responding zeal for the National Cause. The orders directing the recruits to join their headquarters were torn up, the civil authorities were openly defied, and ultimately dragoons had to be sent round the provinces to enforce obedience to the law.^

Arrived at Breslau, Frederick William came more within the direct influence of the Eussians, and on February 23 decided openly to throw in his lot with theirs ; but his celebrated proclamation denouncing the French Alliance, and caUing on the whole Nation to rise against their oppressors, was only published on March 16, and the actual declaration of War did not reach Paris until the 27th of the, same month.

Looking at the numbers actually brought into the field by the date of the iasi great battle of the War of Liberation, Liitzen or Gross Gorschen, on May 2, viz. 95,000 Allies against 145,000 French, one is inclined to think that an even longer delay could only have been advantageous, for the great difficulties in raising fresh troops consisted in laying the foundations of a sound organization and system of administration, matters not easily attended to when once active contact with the enemy has been established. Once it is quite clear ' See V. Holleben.

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 57

who is really responsible for clothing and equipment, who is authorized to sign requisitions and decree new formations, etc., fresh units are comparatively easily called into existence. But all such machinery was idle in the districts stiU held by the French or occupied by the Russians, who were still technically the enemy ; while the poverty of the country, its comparative roadlessness, and more particxdarly the alternations of frost and thaw, made the circulation of orders and instructions most tedious and unreliable.

To overcome, as far as possible, these °f'pruS difficulties the King decided on a bold Reorgani- step, i.e. decentralization. Accordingly he ^* °" decreed on March 15 the sub-division of the Kingdom into four Military Grovernments, viz., (a) the district between the Elbe and Oder, General von L'Estocq ; (6) between the Oder and Vistula, Lieut. General von Tauentzien ; (c) between the Vistula and Russian frontier, Lieut. -General von Massenbach, and (d) the district of Silesia, Lieut. -General Graf. Gotzen — within each of which divisions the civil authorities were made responsible for the supply of recruits, equipment, etc., while the military authorities undertook the organi- zation of the men thus suppUed, their training, and all matters of local defence. Bach unit as it was formed and completed was at once drafted to the Meld Army. It will be clear that even a couple of weeks' delay would have been invaluable to aUow this new machinery to work smoothly ; but at the last, events forced the hands of the King. Napoleon's demands for the supply of fresh troops, and his claim to place Prussian com- mands at the disposal of his Marshals for employment

58 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

against the " common enemy " became too insistent, while on the other hand the continuous advance of the Cossacks, who drove the French out of Berlin on March 3 and 4, 1813, rendered further delay impossible.

Beading and re-reading the mass of documentary evidence accumulated by von Holleben, from whom the above figures and facts are principally taken, an unbiassed critic is absolutely forced to the conclusion that the King showed sounder judgment than all his advisers put together, although their Hst comprises such names as Schamhorst, Biilow, Bliicher, Hardenberg and Stein ; their ideas were premature, his were practical. On March 15 Soharnhorst submitted t& horet^Plan*^® Bang a final project for the organiza- for a tion of a Landwehr and Landsturm through- Lan we r ^^^ ^j^^ whole kingdom, which was finally approved on the 17th of the Same month. The project had indeed been under discussion for months, and the fundamental idea, together with the name, can be traced back to 1658 ; but the poverty of the country was so great, and the difEerent degrees in which districts were or had been afEected by the passage through them of French or Russian troops, prevalence of active hostilities, and so forth, had hitherto rendered any attempt to deal with the matter on a uniform basis, if not impossible, at any rate inoppor- tune. Even as it was, such delays arose in its execution that no formed bodies of Landwehr actually took part in field operations until after the Armistice of June 4, though isolated detachments, temporarily called to- gether without uniforms or even muskets, rendered good service in support of the field troops, both m

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 59

sieges, and in the operations on the Lower Elbe before Napoleon's reappearance on the scene in the beginning of May. Permission was also given by the King of Prussia to form Volunteer Corps, and though these too were not employed until after the Armistice, a recapi- tulation of their names here will be in place. These volunteers found their own equipment, and were com- manded by ex-regular officers.

They were "The LiitzowFree Corps," whose forma- tion, sanctioned on February 18, reached on March 21 a strength of 1,036 men, organized in 4 Companies, and 2 Squadrons, to which subsequently a Battery of 3 guns and 1 howitzer were added.

The foreign battalion, " von Reusz," and the volunteer rifles, " von Reiche," ^ both formed of volTmteers drawn from the rest of Germany, and nearly all deserters from the Westphalian or other contingents of the " Grand Army."

Major Hellwig's volunteers 2 Squadrons of partisan Cavalry; Major von SchiU's Hussar detachment — com- manded by a brother of the celebrated, von SchUl, killed in a raid near Stralsund, 1809 — comprised 2 Squadrons. Also a variety of smaller detachments, mostly com- posed of picked foresters, even of poachers amnestied.

The total of all these formations up to the date of the Armistice only reached the figure of 8,500 men, of whom 2,000 were mounted.^

^ " Von Reusz " and " von Reiche " were the names of their Commanders, not standing, as the names would suggest, in any connexion with the little kiiigdom of Reusz or the Empire.

' As an indication of the difiSculties encountered in raising fresh bodies of troops, the case of Colonel yon Thuimen's detachment may be cited.

Von Thuimen equipped SJ BattaUons in forty-eight hours.

6o THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

Bythe end of March there stood ready for the field :—

(a) 21 Battalions, 40 Squadrons, 1% Batteries, 2 companies'' engineers = 646 officers, 26,510 men, 100 guns — under Bliioher.

(&) 27 Battalions, 24 Squadrons, 11^ Batteries, 4 Companies' engineers = 646 officers, 25,751 men, 106 guns — under Yorok and Biilow.

(6)4 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, IJ Batteries = 61 officers, 2,761 men, 12 guns — under Borstell.

Other small detachments brought the numhers up to 57 Battalions, 70 Squadrons, 27^ Batteries, 7 Companies engineers, 8 park columns, and 1 column tradesmen — in all 1,145 officers, 58,865 men, 234 guns available for field service, but their sick list was very high. In ad- dition there remained 30,077 garrison troops, and 33j,640 in the dep6ts, giving a grand total of 122,582 men.

Compared with the states for August 1, 1811, these figures shew a net increase of 48,169 men, which, even allowing for losses in Russia and a high rate of sickness, seem very small for such an emergency, and appears insignificant compared with the re-creation of the French Army during the same period.

It cannot be doubted that the Prussians as a race were far more aUve to the necessity for personal service

and then started on a marcli of 150 miles through country held by the French. To avoid observation, he had frequently to march by night. The inhabitants proved very lukewarm to the cause, many of the men deserted, and more broke down through hardships entailed by want of clothing, shelter and food.

The origin of the black uniforms of Liitow's Volunteers had nothing to do with the " death or glory" sentiment, but was adopted aa the simplest means of making use of the black civilian coats which the men normally wore, and of the stores of cloth in the tailors' shop. Both cloth and tailors had frequently to be requisitioned. — See Von HoUeben, Vol. I.

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 6i

than were the French, who had not felt the burden of invasion for twenty years, and then only very partially, about one-eighth of the total area of that country only having been affected. The chief difference would seem to be that in France civil and military Government had been accustomed to work together for a whole generation, while for nearly two genera- tions in Prussia miUtary Government had been en- tirely subordinate to the civilians, and the Army and Nation had drifted completely out of touch with each other.

It is interestiag also to compare the relative yield of fresh armed men in Flglwj in 180.^ under threat of invasion only. In that year we raised nearly 600,000 l fighting men on a population about three times greater than that of 'Prussia, the influx, of course, being greatest during the first six months after the King's message of the 5th March announcing the renewal of hostilities after the Peace of Amiens, and our sick hst of course was much less. Yet, making all due allowances, it would seem that our output per cent, was at least double that of the Prussians.^

The most amazing point, however, seems to me to be this, in spite of all the efforts of the Tugendbtmd and other secret societies, to say nothing of the inspiring Volkslieder of Arndt, etc., the two weak battalions of Eeusz and Eeiche appear to have been quite adequate to absorb all the true patriots of the remaining 20 milHon Germans.

Considerable difficidty was also experienced in find-

^ The comparison between the realized military output of Francs in 1792 is also interesting. See Haz Jahns, Das Franzosiche Beer.

62 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

ing new officers for the Forces. The conditions of the entrance examinations had to be relaxed, and the two cadet schools were supressed, their pupils being posted direct to Eegiments. Non-commissioned officers of good character and approved conduct in the field were also freely promoted. The cause of the difficulty, of course, lay in the Treasury policy of the past forty years, which had compelled the retention of officers on the active list long after they ought to have been pensioned. It was not that the Generals of the pre- Jena Army had been too old, but the captains and senior subalterns decidedly were so (the former averaged about the same as those who served under Moltke in the Franco-German War, and were younger than the average of French Grenerals ten years ago) ; they had lost aU youth and activity, and collapsed wholesale under the stress of the retreat.

As regards muskets, there appear to have been suffi- cient for the Field Army, but the depot and garrison troops had to drill with extemporized pikes, while some of the Landwehr, even after the Armistice, were led against the enemy their front ranks provided only with similar weapons. The supply of guns, too, was sufficient, though heavy and antiquated patterns had to be em- ployed,^ and both the draught horses and cavalry

1 It must not be forgotten that the last fifty years had seen an enormous progress in artillery construction, almost as great as the step from the ordinary B.L. guns of the nineties to the present quick firers. The guns had been rendered immensely more power- ful in proportion to the weight behind the trains, while the method of draught and finish of the carriage had also undergone great im- provement. Gribeauval in France, and Schamhorst in Hanover and Prussia had been principally instrumental in securing these reforms. (See M. Colin' s Education de Napoleon.)

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 63

remounts appear to have been fair material, though time was wanted to train them in the systematic manner of former days, and, as Marwitz ^ and others have since shewn us, this training was the real secret of excellence in the old Prederickian Cavalry.

Enghsh subsidies were largely instrumental Sut«i(Ues ^ rendering the equipment of these troops

possible. Unfortunately, we also sent over a number of uniforms of English pattern (colour not stated), and, to quote' Von HoUeben, " The King had to submit to the daily annoyance of seeing his men clad in these tasteless garments." Actually this insult seems to rankle in that author's mind even more than all the exactions of the French Marshals, whose charac- ters he now seeks to whitewash at the expense of -his ancestors' reputation for veracity in the past. However, before long the King had his revenge, for shortly after Waterloo the Prussian cap and frock coat was adopted wholesale in the British Army, and at the present moment it would be impossible to distinguish between Prussian and British troops on a misty morning at fifty yards range.

Meanwhile the Russian Field Army had Russians ^^^^ moving forward, leaving detachments

behind to observe the fortresses of Thorn, Danzig and Kiistrin — ^in all 36,000 men, 313 guns ; and troops to keep order in Poland — ^21,800 men, 150 guns. Making these deductions, however, at the end

' Marwitz's book is now very difficult to obtain and was never translated. Prince Hohenlohe von Ingelflngen's Conversations on Cavalry gives the beat information on this subect. I may also rrfgE^ my own Gavalrg, its Pastffnd^ Futiure. which gives useful 3eSas*Sli" b'oiS lEe'B¥enoE"'and'(5emaircavalry at this period.

64 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

of March, 1813, the troops available for the Field Army numbered 63,686 men and 436 guns,^ of whom 19,000 with 92 guns under Wittgenstein constituted an Advance Guard that was pressing close on the heels - of the retiring French, while the remainder under Kutusow were drawing near to Kalisch on the borders of Silesia.

It is time now to return to the operations

y^njy of the wreck of the Grand Army, which, as we have seen above, had been compelled to evacuate in haste the banks of the Vistula on receipt of the news of Torek's defection at Taurog- gen. Murat's orders we have already given; these were the last he issued, as he was immediately after- wards recalled to Paris, and handed over his command to Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy. At this moment, January 19, the whole of the six Corps, nominally at the Prince's disposal gave him barely 12,000 fighting men, and these almost worn out by privation. He would have had practically no men for field operations, but for the arrival at Posen of some 10,000 provisional detachments of difierent nationaUties ; for the only other troops which had preserved their formsEtion, viz., the Polish Division, Grand Jean, of Macdonald's Corps, and Heudelet's Division of the XI Corps had been thrpwn into Danzig, raising the garrison of that place to 30,000 men, of whom, however, barely two-thirds were fit for active service.

On the right wing the VII Corps (Reynier), two Saxon Divisions and the French Division (Durutte) had se- parated themselves from Schwarzenberg's command 1 Holleben, p. 266.

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 65

when the latter concluded an armistice with, the Rus- sians, and Were marching through SUesia, sufEering continually from the attacks of Cossacks and other local partisans. But Poniatowski's Poles, about 8,000 men, had been cut off in Warsaw, and another 12,000 had been left as garrisons in Modlin, Zamosc and Thorn. In rear of the centre there remained only the 31st division (Lagrange) of the XI Corps, 10,000 strong, but dispersed to hold Berlin and garrison Magdeburg Spandau and the fortresses on the Oder — Glogau, Kiistrin and Stettin, whilst the Division of Grenier, 18,000 men, was only due in Berlin on January 25.

Out of the 12,000 men thus immediately under Prince Eugene's hand he organized four weak Divisions — one Bavarian (General Rechberg), one PoUsh (General Girard), one French (General Gerard), and finally one of the Guard (General Roguet), grouping them around Posen, and drafting all supemimierary officers and non-commissioned officers in excess of their comple- ments back to the depot at Erfurt. The name " Divi- sion "■ was retained in order to deceive the enemy as to their actual weakness. Some 2,000 mounted men, partly surplus to the above detachments, partly rallied to him by force of circumstances, were also organized in two " Divisions.'' With this skeleton force the Prince endeavoured to impose on the Russians and hold the line of the Oder in obedience to the Emperor's orders, until reinforcements from France could reach him. He also summoned Biilow and all other Prussian detachments to his aid, but received evasive answers. Meanwhile the growing imrest in Berlin and its neigh- bourhood compelled him to keep back the new XI

66 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

Corps, organized out of Grenier's 18,000 men, for the maintenance of order in his rear.

His situation soon became hopelessly untenable. Frost held all the rivers in its bonds, and Tettenborn's and Tschitschagow's Cossacks swept all round his flanks. At length on February 12 he began his retreat, reaching Frankfort on the Oder on February 18, where hearing that the Cossacks had already crossed the river further to the north, he continued his movement on Berlin. Meanwhile in the south Reynier's two Saxon Divisions deserted him, and Durutte's Division was surprised on the march and nearly cut to pieces. Viceroy's ^^* ^^^'^ Berlin, (where he had rallied return from on the new XI Corps, to which Gouvion

Berlm g^ q^ -^^ h&en. appointed in command,) could not, as we have seen, be held for long, and on March 5 the Viceroy's (Prince Eugene's) force withdrew to the Elbe, whilst the wreck of Reynier's troops gathered in Dresden. Napoleon wrote one of his characteristic letters to Eugene, censuring him severely, but more as an elder brother than as a Gene- ralissimo, for his failure to hold the line of the Oder ; but his reasoning, though unanswerable from the arm- chair-critical standpoint, like his letters to Jerome when in Spain, made no sufficient allowance for cir- cumstances of weather and topography.

If the old school of strategists had gone altogether too far in the attention they paid to the configuration of the ground and other circumstances which exist only to be conquered by skill and determination, he now overshot the limit of the reasonable in ignoring the limits of human endurance and climatic vicissitudes. To him

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR , 67

as Graf. Yorck von Wartenburg in his Napoleon as a General has well pointed out, a " Corps " remained always a " Corps," even if its numbers had shrunk to 5,000 men or less, while a river or a mountain range was a scratch on a map, unless he happened at the moment to be face to face with it himself. In this instance he had entirely overlooked ^e terrible frost which still held all the rivers of Eastern Prussia in ife grip. Had the jOder been in ite^ normal unfordable condition, undoubtedly the possession of its four for-" tresses, Stettin, Frankfort, Kiistrin and Glogau, might have enabled Eugene to hold it, even with his reduced forces for some weeks longer than he actually did, as the Eussian Army was still a long way ofi and Yorck and Billow's forces were quite insignificant. But in the weather then prevailing the Oder could be crossed almost anywhere, as, in fact, it was, and with a popu- lation on the verge of insurgence behind him, the Viceroy certainly had not a moment to spare when he came to his decision to retreat.

On the question of the abandonment of Berlin, Napoleon's comments are again masterly from the general point of view, although, as above pointed out, no allowance is made for the actual position of affairs as seen by the average man on the spot.

"Nothing is less in accord with sound Co^l^^* military practice than your decision to withdraw your Headquarters behind Berlin (viz., to Schoneberg, a preliminary step to complete withdrawal). It should have been evident to you that this step must attract the enemy. If, on the contrary, you had taken up a position in front of

68 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

Berlin (i.e. east) commuiiicating by convoys with Spandau, and thence isdth. Magdeburg, and had brought up a Division of the V Corps (from Magdeburg) midway between the two latter poiQts,and had constructed there a few redoubts, the enemy would have beUeved that you intended to offer battle. Hence he would not have passed the Oder until he had united 60,000 to 80,000 men, which he was far from being in a condition to do." As a fact, on March 4 the Russians were still five days' march from Berlin, Yorck and Billow even further ; but there is no evidence to show that the Viceroy was aware of this, and in view of the hopeless inadequacy of his mounted forces and the nature of the country, it seems hardly possible that he could have scouted efficiently to that end. Kapoleon then continues : " The day on which your Headquarters retired behind Berlin you practically advertised your determination not to hold that town, and thus lost that attitude of determined opposition which it is the real Art of War to know how to keep. An experienced General ia your place would have established a camp (presumably en- trenched) in front of (i.e. east of) Kiistrin, and thus have gained time to draw forward the CorpI on the Elbe to Berlin. He could not then have been attacked except at the cost of the time it would have taken the enemy to prepare the wide sweeping movements the capture of such a position would have entailed." ^

' References to this maintenance of " an attitude of determined opposition," are frequent in Napoleon's comments and criticisms, and their plain oommonsense is perhaps the reason why they have been so frequently overlooked by his commentators, who were too intent on discovering allusions to the re-entering frontiers, angular relations of lines of operations to bases, etc., to have any attention to spare for the apparently obvious.

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 69

Eugene, however, seems to have had but little choice in the matter of his retreat, and appears to have con- sidered even the Magdeburg road, to which the Emperor refers, .as not safe enough for his retrograde movement, for, in fact, he retreated in two columns, the principal one on Wittenberg, the other by Liickau on Torgau, a Saxon fortress stiU held by Saxon troops, who declined to allow the French to pass on the grounds that Saxony was a neutral country. Refused passage here, the column bent ofE up stream to Meissen, where it arrived most conveniently in time to assist Reynier in over- awing the people of Dresden.

These movements brought the French troops into position along the Elbe, a cordon position of the worst kind ; and here for the moment the Viceroy left them, till, his report having reached the Emperor, a storm of reproaches burst upon his head.

" I do not see what obHged you to quit Berhn. Your movements are so rapid that you have not been able to take the direction I had prescribed (alluding to a previous letter received too late for compliance with its mandates). You have uncovered Magdeburg with- out having taken steps to assure yourself whether it is sufficiently provisioned or garrisoned. Yet it contains all our Field Artillery, and many other important things. (This is hardly fair, as Eugene had, in fact, left there the whole V Corps, some 30,000 men.)

" By your march on Wittenberg you have left un- protected the whole of the 32nd ' Division Mihtaire ' and the Kingdom of Westphalia. You thus run the risk of losing all the Cavalry which is distributed in

70 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

cantonments, and have left the finest provinces of the Empire at the mercy of an advance guard of a few thou- sand men. I have always told you that you should retire on Magdeburg. In laying yoxir lines of com- munication via Mayence, not only have you com- promised the safety of the 32nd 'Division Militaiie,' but also Holland and my squadrons in the Scheldt. It is really time to begin making war seriously. It is in front of Magdeburg (i.e. to the east of it) that you should have united 80,000 men, whence as a centre you would protect the whole of the Elbe. Our opera- tions make us ridiculous in the eyes of our allies and of our enemies, because you constantly retreat a week before their infantry come within sight of you. It is really time that you should set to work-and begin to operate like a soldier. I have laid down what you ought to do."

Then foUows in detail the plan the Emperor wishes to see carried out : —

"Prince Eugene takes position nine to

on°the" twelve miles east of Magdeburg with the V Defence of and XI Corps, Roguet'a Division, and the the Elbe ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ Cavaby— 65,000-70,000

men of the best available— and covers his camp with redoubts, leaving ample space to manoeuvre be- tween them. Marshal Victor with the 4th Division (12 Battalions) moves on the left bank of the Elbe to near Dessau, where he establishes a bridge, and till this is complete a ferry, covered by fortifications. His action will extend as far as Torgau, and the garrison of Wittenberg, raised to 2,000 men. General Reynier, with the 7th Corps (which the Emperor imagined to be

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR yi

12,000 strong, but which was in reality only 6,000) wiU ensure the watch over the line of the Elbe from Torgau to the mountains of Bohemia (about 70 miles) ; he will fortify the bridge at Meissen. The Saxon General commanding in Torgau will employ two-thirds of his force (4,000 men) to watch the river above and below the town ; the rest will remain always in the place. (As we have seen, the Saxon General refused to accept any orders from the French.)

"MarshalDavout, with the 1st Division (16 Battahons) will place himself on the left of Magdeburg (i.e. north). He knows Hamburg and is known there too, and his proximity to that town wiU be very useful. Hamburg win have a garrison of 8,000 men, sufficient, with the aid of its mimicipal guards, to hold the town against the Cossacks. The King of Westphaha will organise a mixed Division of his troops, to be concentrated two or three marches west of Magdeburg, which wfll be ready to support either Victor or Davout as the case may require.

" Of course all the boats on the Elbe and its affluents on the right bank must be systematically destroyed, or brought under the protection of our own guns. The Une of conununications will be from Magdeburg on Wesel.

" The principal Corps, placed in the camp in front of Magdeburg, will send out every day mixed reconnais- sances of 1,500 horsemen and a Division of Infantry. I presume that you do not intend to let yourself be shut in by the Cossacks and a few Battalions.

" In case of an attack directed against the principal Corps, Marshals Victor and Davout will cross the river and manoeuvre against the enemy's flanks.

72 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

" Your position in the camp in front of Magdeburg will re-establish the ' moral ' of your troops. If the enemy marches in force on Havelberg, he must leave at least 80,000 to mask you (and this is impossible, as the Allies have not a sufficient number of men avail- able). If they make a serious effort towards Dresden, more than Reynier can deal with; then the latter will fall back behind the Mulde, or, further, always keeping on your right. Then an advance of the princi- pal corps from Magdeburg or Brandenburg will frighten them and bring them back to the right bank of the Elbe again. In taking up this offensive position and showing the great number of troops you have in Magde- burg, the enemy will be held ia check and will be unable to undertake anything without bringing at least 100,000 men against you ; and seeing himself on the eve of a battle, he will take good care not to make any detach- ments which would weaken him." ^

Although throughout this letter Napoleon had syste- matically overestimated Eugene's forces and under- estimated those of the Allies, the form of defence is perfect ; but before this letter reached its destination the Viceroy had made further dispositions which aggra- vated the evils of the first. He had brought Davout from Hamburg and sent him to command all the troops about Dresden, and had written to justify his previous measures. This brought down on him renewed re- proaches, for, as Napoleon very rightly points out, " for General Reynier to withdraw from Dresden means nothing, but for a Corps (however weak) under the Prince of Eckmuhl to be compelled to retreat is quite ^ Letter of March 19. See also Lanresac, p. 65, et seq.

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 73

another matter ; it would show that we intended to defend that place, but did not dare to act up to our intention." Emperor's Ultimately on March 18, under renewed Plan pressure from Napoleon and the news of °P ^ the occupation of Hamburg by Tettenbom's Cossacks, orders were issued to concentrate in the form indicated in the Emperor's orders, but with the impor- tant exception that the bulk of his troops were retained on the left bank of the river.

Meanwhile, the news from Hamburg which reached the Viceroy became alarming. A rumour was in circulation that 10,000 to 15,000 British troops were expected there, to form the nucleus of a Corps of 10,000 Danes, 5,000 Russians, and some thousand Swedes, their object being an attack on the 32nd " Division Militaire " and a descent thence on the Viceroy's communications with the Rhine. Napoleon was evidently much annoyed at the facility with which such ruatnours gained credence, and he administered to his unfortunate son-in-law the foUowiag reproof : "You go altogether too quickly, and alarm yourself too readily. You attach too much importance to every rumour. More calm is required in the direction of mihtary matters, and before attaching credence to reports they should be carefully discussed. Everything that spies and agents tell you (unless they have seen with their own eyes) is nothing, and even when they have seen, it is worth very httle. Why do you beUeve that the British are going to disembark at Hamburg ? Where are their means ? AH their efforts are directed towards Portugal. Is it because a number of ships are in view ? But you can see thoxisands every day from the coast

74 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

of France. What I tell you is all useless, because it is only experience which teaches one to reduce these astonishing reports to their true dimensions."

Actually this censure was in excess of the Viceroy's deserts, for the Cossacks had spread far into the territory of the 32nd " Division Militaire," and as the inhabitants had risen in many places, it was almost impossible for any accurate idea of the enemy's movements to be ascertained.

On March 31, however, definite news was

Mockern received to the effect that Wittgenstein had quitted Berlin on the 27th, and was marching on Eosslau to cross the Elbe at that place. The Prince now decided to bring his troops over the river to the position indicated in Napoleon's instructions in front of Magdeburg, and from this movement resulted a straggling encounter known as the "Combat of Mockern" on April 3, 4 and 5, only noticeable from the extreme fury with which the raw Prussian troops fought. Their num- bers, however, were far less than Eugene had been led to expect, hence when by the evening of the 5th it had become apparent that there were not 20,000 men engaged in front of him, he concluded that the real main body of the enemy must still be on the march towards Rosslau with the intention of turning his right flank by the left bank of the river, and a report coming in stating that the bridge at Rosslau actually had been captured (a false rumour, as it afterwards turned out to be), he ordered his troops back to the left bank of the Elbe, and the Prussians were far too spent by their exertions to interfere with them.

The whole incident was unfortunate for the French,

THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 75

for the Allies made tte most of their success, and the reports of it went far and wide all over Germany, raising confidence everywhere in the hearts of the patriotic party, which as yet was far from being sjTionymous with the whole Nation. Contrasting Eugene's action with Napoleon's orders, one can only ask oneself wonder- ingly, what possible cause there could have been strong enough to compel the Emperor to leave this most important command in such incapable hands, when all the time there was on the spot perhaps the ablest and most determined of all his Marshals : Davout — a man of Ms own age — active and resolute far beyond the common standard, and devoted to Napoleon heart and soul. Every commentator in turn has asked this question, but hitherto no adequate reply has been suggested.

Viceroy '^^^ Prince now, recognizing the im-

moves to possibility of continuing to hold the line of

Lower Saale ^.j^^ j;j{jg^ determined to defend the Lower

Saale, and during the following days the Army of the Elbe moved into the position shown on Map 1. Wittgenstein having now no enemy in front of him crossed the Elbe at Eosslau on the 10th, and moved southward to gaia touch with Winzinge- rode and Bliicher, whose cavalry scouts already watched the whole line of the Saale, and whose troops were disseminated between Leipzig and Dresden, whilst the Kussian Main Army still lay at Kalisch, retained there byKutusow in spite of the protestations of the Prus- sians. It was only on April 7 that the Russian Guards commenced their march on Dresden, distant 200 miles ; hence they could not be expected to reach Leipzig, 90

76 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

miles further on, before the 27th or 28th of the month.

Till that date therefore the AlUes had not more than 70,000 men available. Hence of necessity they called a halt and busied themselves in the improvement of communica'tions-, notably of bridges across the Elbe at Meissen and Dresden, whilst "Wittgenstein attempted to surprise Wittenberg, but was repulsed.

On April 19 a rumour, premature as it turned out to be, that Napoleon was in full march at the head of the Army of the Maine to effect a junction with that of Prince Eugtoe, startled them into activity. Witt- genstein moved to Diiben, Kleist to HaUe, and Biilow, left before Magdeburg, was reheved by a small Russian corps of observation, and also rejoined the main body (see Map 1).

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD— CONCENTRA- TION OF THE GBAND ARMY, AND OPERA- TIONS TO THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN

CHAPTER IV

Napoleon takes the Field — Concentration of the Grand Army and Operations to the Battle

OP LiJTZEN

Composition ^"^ ^ *^® ^°^ *° retum-to the Emperor, of Grand and to review his acti\dty during these months

""^ of heavy strain. The general idea governing the reconstruction of his

Army has abeady been given in Chapter II. Now it

is necessary to build up the skeleton into which the

raw material available was to be filled. By a decree issued from the Trianon, March 12,^ the

composition of the Army was laid down as foUows : —

I Corps, Marshal Davofit (Prince d'Eckmiihl). Ist, 2nd and

Srd Bivlsions, n Corps, Marshal Victor (Duo de BeUtino) 4th, 6th and 6th

Divisions. HI Corps, Marshal JSey (Prince de la Moskova), the existing

I Corps of Observation on the Bhine, together with the 8th,

9th, 10th and 11th Divisions.

IV Corps, General Bertrand, the existing Corps of Observation

in Italy, with the 12th, 13th, 14th and ISth Divisions.

V Corps, General Lauriston, the existing Corps of Observation

on the Elbe, with the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Divisions.

VI Corps, Marshal Marmont (Due de Bagusa), the existing II jCorps of Observation on the Bhine, with the 20th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Divisions.

VII Corps, General Beynier, intended to comprise the two, Saxon Divisions, the 24th and 25th, and the 32nd Divisiom (Durutte.)

» Corres. 19,698. 79

8o THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

VIII Corps, General Prince Poniatowaki. Two Polish Divisiona Nos. 26 and 27 (only partly raised).

IX Corps. No General named. The 28th and 29th Bavarian Divisions (never completed).

X Corps, General Bapp, in Danzig with the 7th, 30th and 33rd

Divisions (old numhers), the remains of the old 34th Division were absorbed by the 30th.

XI Corps, Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, which had hitherto formed

the Advance Guard on the Elbe, consisted of the 31st, 35th and 36th Divisions.

Besides these troops, the Westphalians were to supply the 37th Division, the Wiirtembergers the 38th Division, the Hessians, Badeners, and Frankfurters the 40th Division, and ten Battahons organized in Erfurt were made into the 41st Division.

Subsequently on April 24, the formation of a XII Corps was decreed, and at a later date a XIII, Head- quarters at Bamberg, was called into existence.

As a whole the plan was never reahzed, for, as already pointed out, circumstances proved even stronger than Napoleon's will, but as far as practicable each fresh unit organized was fitted into its appointed place, so that the framework of an Army existed from the very first, and the commands remained, whatever changes in detail might supervene. This was, of 'course, the fundamental idea in the much criticized paper Army Corps schemes for the British Army of the late Col. Home, R.E., revived by Mr. Brodrick; it is unfortunate that the true paternity of the idea was never put f orvfard.

The procedure in individual cases may be studied with advantage.

The debris of the I Corps had rallied in

^ '"^ Stettin, 68 officers, 1,536 non-commissioned officers and men, on February 17. An order of January 27 had originally laid down the strength

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD ISi

of these Corps at four Divisions of 64 Battalions in all, of whicli tte 1st Division was to be formed by 16 Battalions in Stettin itself, tlie 2nd Division (of another 16) in Erfurt, but on the evacuation of the Oder line this became impossible, and on February 10, the 1st Division began its formation in Leipzig. As the battaUons (practically all new formations) only be- came ready in succession, and jgomplete Divisions were required at the earhest possible date, all the 1st Bat- taUons of Regiments went to the 1st Division, the 2nd Battalions to the 2nd Division, the 3rd and ithBattahons in like manner to the 3rd and 4th Divisions, a method which was generally followed throughout the Army. The 1st and 2nd Divisions, commanded respectively by PhUlipon and Dumonceau, were available for field service by the end of April.

The II Corps. — Originally the Emperor had hoped to constitute this Corps out of the wreck of the old II and III Corps, but this proved quite impossible. No attempt, therefore, was made to build up the Battahons at the front. " But the Com- panies in the Oder fortresses will take the numbers of the Companies belonging to the 5th BattaUons, and those of the 5th BattaUons at the depots take the number of the Companiesof thelstBattaUons, thus I shaU have in France aU the 1st BattaUons at full strength " ^ as Napoleon wrote to his War Minister, General Clarke, on March 31, adding, " Each Regiment in the Grand Army will thus have four BattaUons, with one or two Companies of the 5th BattaUon in the Oder fortresses, and the balance of the 5th BattaUon Companies will be at the d6p6t." I Oorres. 19,790.

G

82 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

Ultimately the 4tli and 5tli Divisions were formed at Magdeburg and Osnabriick respectively, and by the end of April had attained the strength of — 4th Division (Duberton), 12 Battalions, 8 guns, 7,000 men ; 5th Divi- sion (Dufour), 11 Battalions, 8 guns, (5,979 men) ; and they were then moved up to the Elbe and Saale. The 6th Division did not reach the front till the end of June.

J.J - The III Corps, the original Corps of

Observation on the Rhine, was built up of eight Regiments formed of the " Cohorts " (see above, p. 31) of the old 22nd Regiment of the Line (4 BattaUons), 10 provisional Regiments, and the 9th and 29th Light Infantry, both of two Battahons in all 60 BattaUons. The Corps Headquarters were fixed at Mainz, and the Divisions were ordered to con- centrate at Hanau, Frankfurt am Main, and Mainz. The 39th DiAdsion (Badeners, Hessians and Frankfurters) was also assigned to it as a 5th Division. Four Squadrons of the French 10th Hussars, and five Squadrons of the Baden Dragoons were further allotted to it, and by the end of April 44,764 men and 84 gims were available on the Saale. The Divisional Commanders were: 8th Division, Souham ; 9th, Brenier ; 10th, Girard ; 11th Ricard ; 39th, Marchand.

The IV Corps. — Already on January 10,

IV Corps jfapoigon notified the ItaUan chancellor (Melzi), of his intention to concentrate a Corps of Observation at Verona, and on February 27 informed him that the Corps must be ready on March 10 to set out for Augsburg. General Bertrand was to start with the first Division available, the others to follow as they were completed. Eight

~ NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 83

Battalions of " Cohorts," two Line Regiments with nine Battalions, 16 Battalions, conscripts of 1813, 13 Italian, one Algerian and three Neapolitan BattaUons in all, were to supply the Infantry, and two Squadrons of Neapohtans, eight Squadrons of Wiirtembergers, the Cavalry. The Wiirtemberg Division was also assigned to this Corps. Many delays arose in carrying out these orders, and only the 12th (Morand), and 15th (Peyri) Divisions, numbering 18,400 men with 37 guns, were available on the Saale by the end of April. The Wiir- tembergers, 7,204 men, 12 guns, joined on the march, (May 4), at Freyburg (Saxony).

The V Corps. — Eleven Regiments of V Corps ..Cohorts" (44 BattaUons), the 34th Regi- ment of the Line (four Battalions) and four foreign Battalions were assigned to this Corps, and the four Divisions, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th were at first ordered to be formed at Magdeburg, Miinster, Osna- briick and Frankfurt am Main, but at the beginniiig of March they were all ordered up to Magdeburg, where Lauriston assumed the command. Towards the end of April they had attained a strength of 28,000 men (with 67 guns)' unequally divided in the following manner — 16th Division (Maison) eight BattaUons, 17th(Puthbd)12 BattaUons, 18th (Lagrange) 15 BattaUons, 19th (Rocham- beau) 12 BattaUons, the 3rd Light Cavalry Brigade being assigned to them. The 17th (Puthod) was detached towards Hamburg and only rejoined on the battlefield of Bautzen, this left available at the end of April only 32 BattaUons, 51 guns, in all 20,832 men.

The VI Corps.— The II Corps of Obser- vation on the Rhine became the VI Corps

84 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

of the Grand Army, by the decree of March 12, and was to be collected about Mainz. The material avail- able was 20 Battalions of Marines, eight provisional Line BattaUons, four Battahons of the 37th Light Infantry, 10 other Light Infantry BattaUons, and 16 Line Eegiments.

The formation of this Corps met with all kinds of difficulties. Only fourteen Battahons of Marines had arrived on April 15. The 23rd Division (Teste) had only received two of its Battahons on the same date, and had to be left behind in Giessen and finally was only completed in Magdeburg in June, after the Armis- tice.

Thus only three Divisions, the 30th (Compans), 12 Battahons, 21st (Bouet) 13 Battahons, and 22nd (Friede- richs) 14 Battahons, with 62 guns, making 24,250 men, were ready on the Saale at the end of April ; only two Squadrons of Hessians had joined on May 1.

The VII Corps had only the 32nd Division °^^^ (Durutte) available, and on May 1 its strength amounted to only 102 officers, 903 men, with four guns.

The XI Corps was principally constituted out of the only intact reiaforcements for the Grand Army of 1812, on their way to the front in December of that year, viz. the 31st Division (Lag- range) of the old XI Corps, the very strong Division (Grenier), formed in November, 1812, in Verona, was divided into two Divisions on arrival at the front, which received the number 35 and 36. Seven Battahons of the 31st Division had been left behind in Stettin, and the remaining five were grouped with

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 85

five others belonging to a temporary Division under Gerard, who received the command of the whole. Lagrange being recalled to France and given another command instead. Three Polish Battahons were also added, so that by the middle of March the Division, then at Meissen, numbered 13 Battahons, 12 guns. The 35th Division consisted of 12 Battalions and 22 guns, the 36th of 11 Battahons and 14 guns, but as the 31st Division was ordered to find 2,000 men for the garrison of Wittenberg, and to make other detachments, it was only six Battahons (about 3,000 strong) on the resumption of hostihties. The total strength of the Corps on April 15 was only 661 officers, 21,700 men. On April 22 General Gerard was again transferred to the 35th Division. General Ledhu received the 31st Division, and General Charpentier the 36th.

The XII Corps was formed by a decree

of April 24, by taking two Divisions, the 13th (Pacthod) and 14th (Lorencez), frojn the IV Corps and adding to it a Bavarian Division (Rag- lowich). The command of it was given to Oudinot (Due de Eeggio). On April 30 it was in the vicinity of Saalfeld 24,000 men and 50 guns strong.

We have already seen how the Viceroy ^fM ^?^f ^ ^a<i gathered a small body of the Old Guard

under Eoguet around him. On March 13 this httle Division numbered 133 officers, 2,896 Infantry ; 62 officers, 944 men. Cavalry, 4 officers and 188 men artillery and engineers.

About 1,000 other officers and non-commissioned officers for whom no men were available had been sent back by post to France, where on a nucleus supplied

86 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

by 3,000 veterans of the Guard, who had volunteered to rejoin, they proceeded to reconstruct sixty Battalions of the Young Guard. Of these only one Division (Dumoustier), 16 Battalions and 52 guns, reached the front in time for the battle of Liitzen, and a second (Delaborde) joined on May 25, at Dresden.

General Bessi^res received the command of the Cavalry of the Guard, which numbered 2,800 men, with two Horse Artillery batteries. It consisted of two Regiments of the Lancers, one of Chasseurs, one Dragoons, one Grenadiers, the celebrated Mameluke squadron, four Squadrons of " Elite Gendarmerie " and four Regiments of the " Gardes d^hovmew " formed of young men of good family who had hitherto escaped the conscription by paying for substitutes, but at length had been caught by the same trick which was appUed to the " Cohorts." The The Cavalry of the whole Army was, as

Cavalry before mentioned, by far the weakest element of the whole force. It was organized in three Corps, of which the 1st had attained a strength of 172 officers, 3,343 men, 3,705 horses, on the Elbe and Saale, at the end of April. The 2nd, on April 15 numbered 149 officers, 3,144 men, and 3,581 horses ; and the 3rd, which on May 1 was at Hanau, reported 3,895 men fit for duty.

Further formations were in progress throughout the whole of Europe at the time under the Napoleonic dominion, the details of which would require more space than it is possible to afiord. However, the net outcome of the whole was that on May 1, 1813, the Emperor again stood at the head of 226,177 men, with 457 guns, which were subdivided into two Armies, the Army of

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 87

the Main under his own command, and the Army of the Elbe under the Viceroy of Italy (Prince Eugene). To the former belonged the III, VI and IV Corps, the Guards on arrival, and the 3rd Cavalry Corps. The latter comprised the Vand XI Corps and such portions of the I, II, and VII Corps as were available, together with the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps.

The above details will sufB.ce to give some idea of I the extraordinary results that can be accomplished \ with the most unpromising material, under most adverse circumstances, when there is a Man of iron will and resolute purpose at the head of afEairs. If it is objected i that Napoleons are few and far between, the answer ! is that this work of Army reorganization was only a portion of the whole task of Govetmnent which he accomplished, and that his plan bears evidence of haste and want of consideration at every turn, which pre- 1 sumably would not have occurred had he been free to ' give his whole mind to this one question. Moreover, the means of execution, i.e. telegraphs, telephones, railways, good maps, and most important of all, a Stafi * trained systematically to deal with these questions, | are everywhere now available to aid the Leaders of to-day. Compared with what the Emperor actually accompUshed in the four months between his arrival in Paris on December 19, and his departure for the front on April 14, any conceivable task that would fall to the [ lot of a British Commander-in-Chief, even the organiza- ' tion of aU the four million and odd trained men ^ in this country into fighting units, of a kind, would be a relatively easy task, for nowadays the power exists (to the hand 1 See the tables in War and the World's Life by the author.

88 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

of the man who, knows how to use it) of creating a wave of popular feeling which Vrould sweep all local or indivi- dual opposition before it. The essence of the whole matter is that the man should hnow his own mind, and this the average man, whom we may expect to find in authority at any given crisis,, never wiU succeed in doing until he has steeped himself in the knowledge of what has been done, and deduced therefrom what can be done again when a great need arises. But this work will be all the easier, the greater the number of the men beneath him trained to view matters from the same standpoint as himself and to reahze that after aU the Art of War consists, not in striving after unattainable ideals, but in " making the best praaicable use of the m^ans at hand to the aUxdnmemt of the object in view." ^ To return now to the use the Emperor proposed to make of these great masses.

„ , Early in March, he entertained and

Napoleon •' ' i ■ i n i ■

plans a drafted an outline plan, which though it was

Raid on jjgygj. p^^ jj^^ execution, deserves notice

oerlin ^ .... i • i -j.

for the amount of._onticism to which it

has been subjected, and also because its guiding idea recurs repeatedly at a later stage of this campaign (1813). Leaving a retaining force on the Saale, he proposed to cross the Elbe with his main body, march direct on Berlin and thence relieve the garrisons of the Oder fortresses and Danzig. The .chief criticism directed against this has always been, that neither Berlin nor the rehef of the fortresses afforded a suf6.oient objective for a Field Army, wiich should always aim primarily at the destruction of the Field Army of its adversary, ^ Moltke's definition.

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 89

essentially the guiding principle of the whole Napoleonic a> strategy. Further," it is condgnmed because it contains \^ no single alIusion^q_the ^ectstw 6a^fe,.jyhich all somH* strategy shodd aim at. These criticisms come chiefly from Germany, and I confess that for years they Tiad my full adherence, until rcame under the influence

of the modem French school, when Napoleon's reasons . am. The chief difficulty of his situation lay in "Kblduig. or inducing his p.TieTnip.a t,o stand, or indeed in controlling their action in any way. The march to Berlin, thence onward, ultimately towards Konigsberg, not only meant the ruin of the Prussian Monarchy for a second time, but also threatened the Eussian communications with Petersburg. It was, therefore, a reasonable calculation that the threat on Berlin, as once before at Jena, would bring the AlUes down in force to oppose it, and marching in his favourite haMdlion carree it was, as already explained, immaterial to him when, where or how they chose to attack him.

His reason for abandoning the idea has never to my j knowledge been made clear. The necessity often alleged / for covering the Southern States of Germany to ensure their loyalty has never appealed to me as adequate, because nothing would seem better adapted to secure their wavering attachment than the sight of the beaten Russians and Prussians straggling back upon their frontiers. More probably the scheme was originally ( based on insufficient information, and was given up when it became clear that the total force the Allies could have concentrated to oppose him was altogether too small to offer them a reasonable prospect of success in the battlefield ; therefore they would voluntarily.

go THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

(abandoning Berlin and East Prussia), fall back into

Russia, when lie would again find himself face to face

with the terrible problem of the previous year, and with

far less satisfactory material to enable him to deal with

it. At the time of its inception also he had still no

adequate idea of the completeness of the disintegration

which his old Army had undergone, and he attached

far more value to its fragments than they actually

deserved. With them the process of " war seasoning "

had been overdone, and " war weary " would better

1 describe them. " IJiave 600 men of_the-..fiaaid with

' me here," wrote Rapp from j>anzig^' but not two hun-^

I ^eTwiir^irnBe. fit for Jhe^field^again " — and if this

was the case with the Guard, the condition of the rest of the Army may be imagined !

Meanwhile, the action of the AUies was the*Mi^' forcing Napoleon's hand, and the question of the neutraUty of the German Southern States became a matter of time, whilst the attitude of Austria was more than threatening. From Dresden, their advance if continued towards the upper waters of the Saale and Main, covered Bavaria and Saxony, and might even jeopardize the arrival of the IV Corps from Italy via Augsburg. On the other hand, the further they continued in this direction, the more they exposed their own conununications to a blow from the north-west, and the chance of catching them in a position in which they would be compelled to fight increased. He, therefore, now busied himself with a plan which was abnost the exact inverse of his Jena Campaign, and issued orders to unite his whole force in the angle of the upper Saale and Elbe.

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 91

Positions 0^ •^P"^ 11' ^'^ heads of the several on nth Corps had attained the positions shown on ^P"* Map 1 A.A. The Army of the Elbe lay with its Headquarters at Aschersleben — about 30 miles south of Magdeburg. The III Corps along the road from Aschafienburg to Schweinfurt ; VI Corps around Hanau; Guards at Mainz; the IV and XII coming from Italy with their head at Anspach and the rear- most Division ten days' march behind, near Augsburg. The Emperor knew from a certain source that the Russian Guards had only commenced their march from Kalische on April 1, and could not, therefore, reach the troops abeady iu the field before May 1 ; but it was always possible that the latter might continue their advance without waiting for the Guards, in which case they might reach the Saale by April 20. There- fore, he had to be prepared for this contingency, though it was an improbable one.

Accordingly he prescribed the next stage

for of his advance in such a manner that his con-

Concentra- centration would be assured "whatever case

°" arose. To this end the Army of the Elbe was

directed to advance to the line of the Wipper — a small

affluent of the Saale, with its left resting on the latter

river and its right on the slopes of the Harz

Mountains, thus threatening the enemy's right if

they should attempt to march upon Erfurt. The VI

Corps and Guards were to move along the great road

from Mainz through Fulda, Gotha, to Erfurt, the

III Corps from Schweinfurt to Meiningen, and the

IV and XII Corps by Bamberg, Coburg, and Graf- enthal.

92 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

The Emperor had caused most careful recon- naissances to be made of all the roads through the Thujinfflan forest — a mountainous densely wooded .. I jjistrictroSPn^es rising, some 3.000 feet above the^ plain. He knewtEat from Meiningen and Coburg alternative roads existed which would enable him either to direct the further movement of these Corps on Erfurt or on the Saale, as the case might require. If now the Allies determined to march either direct upon Erfurt or against the Army of the Elbe, in either case the latter could hold them till the centre and right swung in — or if by the time they reached the above-mentioned places it was clear that the enemy was moving southward against the right column, or waiting for the Russian Guards to arrive — the whole of his forces could combine their forward movement, and complete their concentration in the neighbourhood of Leipzig ; and this was what actually happened.

On April 24 the French had reached the positions shown on Map 1 b.b., and it was clear that no further interference with their concentration about Leipzig was to be anticipated. The Army of the Elbe still lay on Ijhe Wipper, the III Corps at Weimar, followed by the Guards, which had passed the VI Corps at Erfurt, and the VI strung out along the road from Gotha to Vacha for some 30 miles. The IV and Xll-Corps lay with their advance guard at Grafenthal, their main body extending from Coburg to Ans- pach. The Bavarians were on the extreme right at Bayreuth, the total frontJbdng.>boiit 140 miles. depth 60 nules. But theEflo^eror himself had delayed too long at Mainz, trusting to hislGenftrala on the spot.

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 93

and as usual they had fallen far short of his reasonable expectations. .Ney-rhaving reachgd__Mgiiiiijgfin7~lin^ not hfl,viT\p; fl.pprp.f^iptiprl TJgpp]poii'B reason for ordering hjm^to make a temporary halt at that place, had con- cluded, that as the road from Meiningen to Weimar across the hills was rather an indifferent one, he would take the easy one down the valley to Eisenach, and cut in on the main road through Erfurt to that place. He thus fouled the line of march of the Guards and VI Corps, blocMng^em^SkaU along the road.

Cavalry ^^ *^® same time the Cavaby of the Raids by AlUes made a succession of brilliant attacks * '^* in the district between the Wipper and Unstrutt with the result that a series of regrettable incidents, from the French point of view, took place. On April 12, Major Bliicher (son of the Field-Marshal) at the head of some. 200 Prussian Hussars appeared before Weimar, with this result, that the Saxon Battalion on duty immediately laid down its arms. On the 17th, Major Helwig with a Squadron of 150 men fell suddenly upon the rearguard of the Bavarian Division (Rechberg) near Langen-Salza, capturing some hundred men and a couple of guns. On the 18th the same party dispersed a WestphaUan Cavalry regiment, near Wanried on the road to Cassel, thus creating wild alarm in King Jerome's mind. Finally, reports of all these events reaching Ney at Erfurt on the 19th, caused him serious apprehension of more 'to follow. The result was a series of orders and.cx)unter- orders which narrowly escaped throwing the whole comman3~uito disorder. As Marshal BessiSres wrote to Berthier, ^' 1 must tell you frankly that if the enemy

94 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

had been advancing on Naumburg and Jena as the Prince de la Moskova wrote to me that night, we should have been in no position to meet them, or the Prince either."

Meanwhile the Emperor's orders were '^^d*""'* ^^^*'^y on their way for the whole Army to concentrate on the Saale on April 25.

" The Army of the Main marches on Jena and Naum- burg ; the Army of the Elbe will move up the Saale and occupy Halle and Merseburg. The Corps from Italy, if circumstances permit, will marchby SaaUeldpn Jena, by the left bank of the Saale."

^^^lucidation. of this the Major Generalj[Beitbier, .wrQli&.tOLPrince Eugene from Mainz (April 22) : —

" The Emperor is to-day stiU in Mainz. As the Corps of the Prince de la Moskova cannot be completely closed up until the 24th, it is necessary for you to occupy Querfurt so as to maintain direct communication with the Prince, who is going to occupy the heights above Naumburg. Destroy the bridge which the enemy has over the Saale near Wettin. Occupy Halle and Merse- burg as bridge heads, and place these towns in a con- dition of defence against Cossacks by palisa^g the gates. Occupy Halle first, Merseburg afterwards. The Emperm's intention is to guard the whole of the Saale, so that the enemy cannot penetrate to the left bank at any spot. You must be on the alert to march at once against the enemy should he advance from Jena or Naumburg." FoUowing closely upon these orders,

Iwwce ^^^ Emperor himself reached Erfurt on the

morning of the 25th April, and the first duty

to claim his attention was the arrangements of the Supply

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 95

Service. Jhe Corps had taken the fiel(L:sjjfliJb:Qm 12 to 14days' bread, biscuit.eE meal — four days' rations carried by the men, the remainder in carts, and they had Uved as far as possible on the country they had traversed. But now they were too concentrated to do this, and were to be fed from the magazines Napoleon had ordered to be prepared in Erfurt. Evidently this service had been neglected, for on the evening of the 25th we find a letter to Marshal Duroc.

" Collect to-night the Intendant and two or three of the principal members of the administration of the country, as well as the Commissary of War, and settle what steps are to be taken to collect supphes at Erfurt. We must have in four days 200,000 rations of bread to issue at the rate of 50,000 a day. They must also pro- cure as soon as possible, two miUion rations of flour — as much beef on the hoof and brandy; also two miUion rations of oats. To get these quicker you are to pay cash." Communi- The main line of communication for the cations, jfg^jjj Army was to be by Mainz, Fulda, Gotha, while the IV and XII Corps after passing Saalfeld were to give up completely their previous line, viz., Coburg and Nuremburg ; and any com- munications necessary with Augsburg were to go by Eulda-Wurzburg, an indication of the growing insecurity of the country. A comparison of the halting places actually attained with the orders issued, shows that in the Army of the Main all the prescribed marches were duly and punctually performed, but the Army of the Elbe was 24hours latein starting and then pnly^ averaged seven miles a day. No explanation of this extraordinary slowness is forthcoming, but it is worth while to note in

96 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

passing that, with Napoleon in person on the spot, twenty-five, even thirty miles a day was by no means an unusual effort for bodies of such strength to ac- complish. Singularly, also, there is no trace of any reprimand being administered to Eugene for this dilatoriness.

French ^'^ *^® 30th, the several Corps at- Positions tained the under-mentioned positions. (See 30th April jyj^p 1 )

Army op the Main. Headquarters of the Emperor : Weissenfels. The Imperial Guard : Weissenfels.

III Corps : Headquajters and four Divisions ; East of Weissen- fels. Marchaud's Division : Stossen.

VI Corps. Headquarters and two Divisions : Naumburg. Fried- rich's Division : Kosen.

IV Corps : Along the Saale from Domburg to Jena and Rudolstadt. XII Corps: Still in rear, between Saalfeld and Coburg.

The Abmt or the Elbe. Headquarters and Division Roguet (Guards) : Mersebnrg. 1st Cavalry Corps and XI Corps : Three miles east of Merseburg

V Corps : Three Divisions west of Merseburg ; a detachment

of four Battalions at Halle. 32nd Division : at Schafstedt. 4th Division (Victor) : Bernburg.

The ten Battalions of this Division formed a cordon all along the Saale, which river was henceforth so closely watched that none of the enemy's Cavalry succeeded in crossing it. This cordon defence of a river line was Napoleon's expedient to compensate for his deficiency in Cavalry, for it gave him " security" and ensured secrecy of his own movements, but of course it could not help him to ascertain what his enemy was about. For this, however, he cared little ; he h^ now 145,(XX) men in hand ready to fight in any direction at a moment's notice, and it mattered nothing to him when or where

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 97

he met his opponents, if only they would fight to a finish

when they did encounter him. Secrecy and promptitude

were, however, the essential factors of the situation, for

if once the Allies reaUzed the overwhelming numbers

against them, they would certainly concentrate to the

rear, as for the moment they had no interest in the

actual occupation of the groimd on which they stood.

Experience had shown them the efficacy of a rapid

retreat as a means of evading Napoleon's sledge hammer

blows.

Napoleon's ^^ orders, therefore, for May 1, ran as

Orders ist foUows, " The Army of the Elbe is to

*^ advance in front of Merseburg to Schlade-

bach — placing Merseburg in a condition of defence.

" The III Corps with the Cavalry of the Guard from Weissenfels towards Liitzen.

" The VI Corps to support the III with two Divisions, the third remaining at Naumburg. The Imperial Guard (two Division) to Weissenfels.

" The IV and XII to continue towards Naumburg as rapidly as possible."

As this movement took the Army out into open country very favourable for the enemy's Cavalry, to avoid any possibility of surprise, the troops now marched in masses straight across country.

The formation of the III Corps may be taken as the type generally followed. Behind an Advance Guard consisting of all the Corps Cavalry (a Brigade of 10 Squadrons), two Battalions and a half Battery of Light Artillery, the Main Body followed at a distance of about 3,000 yards in as many lines as it contaiaed Brigades. Each Brigade was in line of

98 TEE, LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

columns of Regiments (four Battalions) with double company front at half distance, so as to be able to form regimental squares rapidly. The Artillery of each Division between the leading Brigades.

As Napoleon had expected, the Cavalry of the Allies attempted several charges during the day, but were easily repulsed with a trifling loss. There was no longer a Seydlitz to lead them, nor were they trained to that great Leader's standard of perfection ; and the day would have ended most satisfactorily but for the unfor- tunate death of Marshal Bessieres, killed dead by a cannon shot at the passage of the Rippach. The bear- ing of the young soldiers had won the approval even of Key, who with many others seems at first to have had serious doubts as to their steadiness. At the close of the day the Emperor was at Liitzen.

Abmy Off THE Elbe.

XI Corps from Quentz to Markranstadt.

V Corps in rear of Gimthendorf.

1st Cavalry Corps, between Sohladebaoh and Oetzaoh. 32nd Division, at Meraeburg.

Abmy or the Main. Cavalry of the Guard at Liitzen. Imperial Guard (two Divisions) Weissenfels.

III Corps. Headquarters : Kaja.

(Souham's Division : Kaja, Bahna, Klein and Grosz Gorsohen. Girard's Division : Starsiedel. Brennier's Division : near Liitzen. Bicard's Division : near Liitzen. Marohand's Division : near Liitzen.

VI Corps. Headquarters : near Bippach.

Bouet's Division ; near Bippaoh.

Compans Division : near L6sau, west of Bippaoh.

Ireidriohs' Division : at Naumburg.

IV Corps. Headquarters : Stfissen.

Morand's Division : StSssen ; Advance Guard : Pretzsoh. • Peyri's Division : Grosz-Gestewitz. Wiirtemberg Division : Jena.

XII Corp. Head of Column at Kahja, rear near SaalfeW,

N'APOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 99

Looking at tte Map we see that the corree or lozenge formation, has been modified to suit the circumstances. On the left the flank being protected by the Elbe and Elster, needs no particular precaution, so the whole left and centre are closed up to form the " mass of manoeuvre " — ^the right flank being covered by the III Corps and Guards, from Weissenfels to Liitzen, whilst the IV Corps from Stossen to Jena is in a position to outflank any attack upon the III coming from the southward.

From the reports of the enemy's movements received, it appeared that the latter was concentrating about Zwenkau, whilst a portion of his troops still held Leipzig. Judging from his knowledge of Wittgenstein's character, the Emperor considered an attack on his right flank during the next day as highly probable. But this threat did not deter him an instant in his determination to gain ground to the front and appear m mass in the plains to the east of the Elster on May 3.

As a measure of precaution, however, the III Corps around Liitzen was ordered to stand fast till noon, whilst the Army of the Elbe advanced on Leipzig, and all other elemeflts of the Army closed in on the III Corps.

In case of an attack from Zwenkau the III Corps is thus facing in the required direction to act as Advance Guard — to fix the enemy and allow the remainder of the Army to manoeuvre against him.

Kaja is about 13 mUes from Leipzig. 16 miles from Markranstadt, _5_fr^i. fiippach, 10 from Weissenfels. and M from Stosaen. The III Corps 45,000 strong, is therefore amply sufficient to hold its ground imtil

100 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

reinforcements arrive, and in six hours at latest the

whole Army, 145,000 men — less the Division ordered

to Leipzig, wiU be actually deployed in line of battle/

In their execution of these orders the

^^en ' troops had reached the position shoivn in

the sketch, when about 11 a.m. a tremendous

cannonade burst out in the direction of Kaja, and

Napoleon leaving the Army of the Elbe to continue

its movement, galloped across country to see what

had happened.

Reaching the brow of a low undulation which hid I the field of action from his sight, he suddenly discovered Souham's DiAdsion (part of it already in serious dis- order), beset by overwhelming forces of the enemy. Souham's troops had allowed themselves to be surprised in broad daylight by almost the whole of their adversary's Army.

The Emperor was not disconcerted even for a moment. Taking the whole situation in at a glance, he issued the following terse and fitting orders.

" ThelllCorgs^ will hold its position at my cost. Its business is to fix the enemy, and thus form a mvot on which the rest^p^ the Army can manmume.

" The Vi Corps prolongs the right of the III Corps.

" The IV Corps moves against the enemy's left.

" The XI and 1st Cavalry Corps against his right.

" The V Corps occupies Leipzig with one of its Divisions, the others to be echelonned near Markranstadt ready to move on Kaja.

" The Guard marches to the sound of the guns."

Here we will leave him and return to the doings of the AUies which had led to this surprise.

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD loi

Movements ^® ^^^ them last" on April 19, just at tlie of the moment when a premature rumour of the '^® arrival of the Emperor at the front com- pelled them to decide on a course of action.

At this date the Corps of Miloradowitch was moving from Dresden to join Bliicher at Altenburg, where he had been since the 14th of the month, and the Russian Guards were still five marches to the west of Dresden. The news of the death of Kutusow had just been received, and Wittgenstein appointed to the Command- in-chief of the whole Army. At this date, inclusive of the troops already on the Saale, it consisted of 65,000 Infantry, 22,000 Cavaky, 8,000 Artillery with 450 guns. A rearward movement of concentration would undoubtedly have been the best plan to adopt from a strictly military point of view, but to withdraw without even the show of a fight would have been politically disastrous, in view of the attitude of Austria and the state of pubHc feehng aU over Germany. Moreover, the Prussian troops were still too raw to stand the strain of a prolonged retreat. A defeat in battle even if accom- panied by heavy losses, might, in the exalted condition of patriotism in which they found themselves, be far better for their subsequent cohesion than the depressing influences of a continuous withdrawal. Finally, in view of the reports that had reached them, as to the poor condition of the French Cavalry and conscripts, both Bliicher, Yorck and Wittgenstein felt that with 22,000 horsemen behind them, in a theatre of rolling plains especially favourable to their action, the chances in favour of a victory were good enough to justify the risk. The only point unsettled was the best point of concentration

102 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

to select. Wittgenstein had rightly gauged the intention of Napoleon to advance through Leipzig, and had called up Bliichet from the south to Boma, whilst he himself had determined to concentrate between Leipzig and Wiirzen. But the Emperor Alexander, who arrived at this moment, considered that this disposition ren- dered it probable that, in case of disaster, the whole Army would be thrown back on the Elbe about Torgau — and he decided on a more southerly position between Leipzig and Boma.

They were in this position when, in the course of May 1, the reports of Cavalry — most accurate as to what could actually be seen — led them to conclude that the whole French Army was moving in one long column on Leipzig, hardly guarding their right flank at all. And the opportunity to take advantage of this negligence was too tempting to be allowed to escape them. This conclusion, though in fact erroneous, was an almost inevitable consequence of the failure of the Allied Generals to penetrate the real secret of the Napoleomc methods.

Accordingly, leaving Kleist in Leipzig to hold the town (a semi-mediaeval fortress) to the last, orders were issued at 11.30 p.m. on May 1, to the following effect : —

" The Corps of Miloradowitch (12,000 men) on Zeitz to watch in the direction of Naumburg and Jena.

" The Corps Winzingerode (12,000 men), to Werben, to cover the passage of the main Army over the Elster and Flossgraben.

" The Corps of Bliicher (27,000 men) in two columns to cross the Elster at Storkwitz and Pegau.

" The Corps of Yorck (7,500 men) passes the Elster

NAPOLEON- TAKES THE FIELD 103

at Pegau, after Bliiclier's left column., the troops of Berg at Storkwitz behind the right.

"The Guards (18,500 men) foUows the troops of Yorck and Berg.

" The Army will form up beyond the Flossgraben, the right on the canal near Werben, and the left at Griinabaoh near Sohesten, the movement to be com- pleted by 7 a.m."

The troops were on the march between 1 and 2 a.m. (they were, therefore, probably awaiting the- arrival of the above orders), but from want of clearness in their instructions, the oolunms crossed one another, and the resulting delays postponed the final deployment till 11 a.m. The Army then #tood in three lines, hidden by a roU of the ground, some 2,000 yards south of Gross Gorschen. Owing to the long night march, the men were much exhausted, and it was decided to allow them another hour's rest. Meanwhile Wittgenstein, with ' the Headquarters Staff, rode forward to a mound about 1,200 yards south of Gross Gorschen, whence they saw great clouds of dust hanging heavily over the main road to Leipzig, and in the immediate foreground were a large mass of French troops cooking their dinners and completely off their guard.

J]jis__was Souham's Division of Key's Corps waiting for further orders, and what followed was an exact anticipation of the opening of so many actions in the 1870 campaign — ^notably that of Vionville, both sides making the same mistakes.

The whole Army of the Allies being already

the^Uief deployed, it would have sufficed to launch a Cavalry Division on Souham to overwhelm

104 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

all opposition, and then to advance over the wreck of the French Advance Guard with the whole of the Artillery and Infantry on a broad front, crushing each fresh echelon of the enemy as it came on the ground. Instead of '"this, the Allies grew circumspect, and advancing some 36 guns, opened the attack with a single Brigade, and the first shots fired gave the alarm to the whole of the French Army.

The first rush of the Prussians easily carried Gross Gorschen, but when they endeavoured to throw a mass of 23 Squadrons on the retreating French— ;g, hne of Batteries came rapidly into action between Rahaa and SSn Gorschen, and brought the former to a stop with case shot. Then Girard's Division arrived on the spot, and immediately afterwards the whole of the VI Corps (Marmont) came up on his right about Starsiedel,sothat bj_10^£jm^ about 40;(P00 French were in action against sonxe,65j^0pQ^of the Allies. Then followed a series of dis- connected and successive attacks by Brigades, where whole Army Corps would have been more to the purpose, and after desperate fighting the villages of Rahna and Klein Gorschen also fell into the hands of the Alhes, who then prepared to push forward on Kaja, where Ney'in person had in the meantime arrived. Placing himself at the head of Brenier's Division, on whom the remains of Girard's and Souham's commands at once ralhed, Ney led them forward, and with the bayonet drove the AlHes back to Rahna and Klein Gorschen. Again the Prussians threw in another Brigade, and in turn the French gave way. Napoleon ^^ ^-^ Napoleon rode up to Kaja with on the the Guards. His arrival produced an extra- ^*'* ^ ordinary effect on his troops, who saluted

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 105

him "with cries of 'Vive I'Einpereur,' in which even the wounded and dying joined " (vide testimony of von Odeleben, a Saxon officer on Napoleon's staff). Instantly taking in the situation; he sent his A.D.C., General Mouton, to Eicard's Division (the last closed reserve of the III Corps), with orders to execute a counter attack, and again bearing down all opposi- tion, the French became masters of the two villages.

Meanwhile, the Cavalry and Cossacks of the Allies had been thundering down in a succession of disunited charges on Marmont's Infantry, and the Marshal, impressed by the visible masses of the enemy in front of him, sent to Napoleon for reinforcements.

The reply he received was characteristic. " Tell your Marshal he is mistaken, the decision Ues at Kaja, not at Starsiedel."

A lull in the battle now set in, only the Artillery on both sides contiaued their fire, and meanwhile Wittgen- stein^ learning of the approach of the IV and XI Corps, prepared for a final effort. The moment was critical for Napoleon — it was about 4.30 p.m. — the III Corps was practically burnt out and useless, the VT could not be moved, as its presence at Starsiedel was imperative to protect the flank of the III Corps, and only the Guards were available on the spot. But he hesitated to engage them, because he saw that the " battle was not yet ripe," i.e. that the enemy had not yet expended all his reserves and reached that crisis of nervous exhaustion on which the success of the aggressor's final blow depends.

At this moment, about 4.30, some Battalions of the III Corps broke. TlieEmperor gaUopeTmto"tlLe ini33Ie OTthem, raUied them by the sheer ma^etic power of

io6 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

his personality (none who hved through this moment could ever forget it), and sending in a Brigade of the Young Guard to give them a lead, led back the whole III Corps into the fight. On no occasion in his whole career did Napoleon expose himself" mofe~recEIess]y7' andneverhad" 'ES'exSaorHjnar y poweF of command asserted itself to a greater extent. It was not, and could not be the mere example of personal courage. In an Army numbering such men as Ney, Mouton, and Rapp in its ranks, personal courage in itself would hardly have attracted unusual attention, i It was the indefinable something in the man himself that reawakened the con- fidence and enthusiasm of all ranks, which, to put it gently, had slumbered somewhat during the months succeeding his hurried departure from Smorgoni on December 14, 1812.

This must be borne in mind throughout the whole of this campaign, if the extraordinary heroism of the French troops immediately under his eyes is to be understood and explained.

At last towards 5 p.m. the XI Corps •preceded by all its Artillery (60 guns), began to arrive from the direction of Eisdorf and Kitzen, reaching well round the enemy's right wing, and at the same time Morand's Division of the IV Corps appeared upon their left.

Napoleon's '^^® *™® ^^^ ^*^^ oova.G for the final Decisive " knock out " blow, and T^rnnnt with sixty ^^^^^ guns of _the Guard Artillery galloped out_to, the front, and unlimbering at case shot range, began to" tear'^ibhe "very leaft out of the Allied Army, whilst tiie whole Infanta^of_theGuard followed in rear, sweep- ing along with it all that~itnniad life in the sorely

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 107

shattered III Corps. The Allies gave way at all points, but the blow had been timed a Httle too late, and in the absence of an ef&cient Cavalry, darkness intervened to prevent the victorious Infantry reaping their fuU reward.

To cover their retreat, the Cavalry of the Alhes made several gallant charges, and finally just before midnight, a party of eleven squadrons, under a Colonel DoKs, in the midst of complete darkness, over difficult ground, and guided only by the bivouac fires, threw themselves into the very heart of the French lines. What followed has never been quite clearly established. The French deny all panics, the Prussians affirm them ; all that is certain is that the French were kept under arms aU night, and morning found them too completely worn out to pursue.

No more striking contrast, iUustrating the difference of the fighting value between troops raised under the old long service conditions, fighting for " the honour of their arms " and those raised under the new, inspired primarily by a feeling of nationality, can well be desired than is presented by the different conduct of the Prussians on this occasion and at Jena. The Army of Jena, with a Man at the head of it, would probably have overwhelmed the III and VI Corps in an hour (as Frederick the Great had overwhelmed Soubise barely sixty years before within twenty miles of the same spot), then with the impetus of success on its side it would have swept the remainder before it. It would certainly have stood up to far heavier punishment on the field, for compared with Torgau, Zomdorf, and Kunersdorf,^ the losses at Gross

' Prussian losses at Torgau 29'8 percent., Zomdorf 37 '5 percent., Kunersdorf 48'2 per cent.

lo8 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

Gorschen (or Liitzen as the French call it) were not severe ; but once beaten, they would have dissolved, precisely as they had done at Jena and Auerstadt.

The new Prussian Army, thoug];i badly beaten, refused to dissolve. Every man wanted to get back to his own Battalion ; and not having lost all sense of locahty by many years' confinement to the barrack yard and one mile beyond it, even a dark- night proved but little obstacle to their doing so. In a surprisingly short time the stragglers had sorted themselves out, and were well on their way from the field, and when next morning dawned not a single gun or trophy of any kind remained as prizes for the victorious French.

This was a most fatal blow to the Imperial prestige, for it entirely obscured the remarkable strategy that had united about 140,000 men on the battlefield, but called attention to the fact that these 140,000 odd had not achieved sufficient success against the 75,000 of the allies to bring in a single gun or other trophy. All other conditions which might be brought forward to palliate this want of success, i.e. want of Cavalry, the darkness of the night, etc., were overlooked in the general rejoicing in every Foreign Ministry in Europe over this striking contrast between Napoleon's previous victories and that of Liitzen.

Nor had the Emperor better reason to be pleased with the fighting quahty which his men had shown. He had actually engaged three Corps, about 60,000 men, had expended one completely, and but for his arrival in person on the scene with the Guard, there could be no doubt that both the VI and III Corps, together with any other Corps in the Army except the Guard, would

NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 109

have been completely defeated under any of his Marshals. Yet the Allies had not engaged the whole of their forces, for (apart from Biilow, who away to the north near Halle had been left out of the combination entirely) Miloradowitch, delayed on the march by causes no longer possible of elucidation, had failed to reach the battlefield before the resolution to retreat had been taken.

It will be noticed also that throughout the day the Allies were on interior lines relatively to the French, yet even with the additional advantage of surprise on their side, this could not save them. Had Wittgenstein's original proposal to concentrate 9,bout Wiirzen been adhered to, they would then have been outside the horns of the attack, with the whole Corps of Biilow, (inclu- sive of Kleist) available, and might then have entertained the reasonable expectation of crushing the heads of the French columns as they defiled across extemporized crossings over the Elster, and out of the narrow gates of Leipzig. This is assuming that Kleist had aban- doned that place of his own free will, without any ade- quate garrison, a course he had no reason to adopt, since poor though its fortifications undoubtedly were, 5,000 men could have held it for days against an Army unprovided with a siege train.

It has been pointed out above that the old Prussian Army would have attacked en masse and overwhelmed the III Corps in its first rush. This marks a very important difference between the guiding ideas of the post-Eevolutionary tactics and those of the Frederickian era, and deserves more attention than it has yet received, since it involves the whole theory of the use of reserves in battle.

no THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN

»

The fundamental conception imderlying the old Line tactics lay in the idea of overwhelming the enemy by a single crushing blow, in contradistinction to the plan of VKd/rihg him down by attrition. The same idea still imderlies the employment of Cavalry in action, and may be justified by the following reasoning. If we imagine the " Line," whether of Foot or Horse, to move forward as an irresistible scythe of death, exterminating every Uving thing lying within its swathe, it is quite clear that Keserves following behind it would be useless, except perhaps to collect and bury the dead.^

No " Line " has ever quite attained this utmost expres- sion of destructive power — ^but the old " Line " of Frederick the Great's Infantry, giving its four regular voUeys a minute, or SeydUtz's Squadrons sweeping down " knee behind knee " not merely " boot to boot " (see von der Marwitz) made a very close approximation to this ideal, and the nearer it was approached the fewer .the Eeservesthat either required. But for the attain- ment of this ideal, the highest possible skill was needed in every individual concerned, from the Divisional General down to the private, and this skill the short training which was available under the new conditions imported by the Revolution could not supply.

Hence the necessity for heavy reserves became appar- ent, and in time this provision of reserves came to be regarded as the essential point, and not ike provision of an aU-destroying " Line." But prevision to meet its inevitable shortcomings was